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Abstract
This Article considers the trend to effectuate judicial economy within international criminal
trials juxtaposed with the principle of equality of arms from the standpoint of the defense. It
focuses on this juxtaposition as exemplified in contemporary case law of the ICTY. In addressing
this issue, the analysis in this Article will build on the assumption that the interrelationship between
these two notions must be interpreted in light of two cardinal parameters: first, the protection of
the interests of the defense, and second, the principle of independence and non-political use of the
notion of judicial economy.
NOTE
REASON WITHOUT BORDERS:
HOW TRANSNATIONAL VALUES
CANNOT BE CONTAINED
Shane B. Kelbley*
And what is good, Phaedrus? And what is not good?
Need we ask anyone to tell us these things ?'
INTRODUCTION
As the United States enters an age of increasingly globalized
economies, governance, media, and trade, the U.S. Supreme
Court finds itself at the forefront of a controversy implicating the
globalization of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.2 Proponents
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; Editor-in-Chief, Vol.
XXIX, Fordham International Law Journal; B.A., Boston University, 2001. The author
would like to thank Professors Liz Cooper and Martin Flaherty for their invaluable com-
ments. Special thanks are also due to Rosa Morales and Benita Hussain, without whom
none of this would have been possible, and to my father, Professor Charles Kelbley, for
reading all my drafts and for being my finest teacher, in law and in life.
1. ROBERT PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY
INTO VALUES, epigraph (1974) (paraphrasing Plato's Phaedrus).
2. See David Shaw, Matters of Taste: What's Behind the Buzz, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2005, at F1 (noting increased globalization in wine industry); see also Editorial, The Fu-
ture of Irish Film, IRISH TIMES, July 1, 2003, at 15 (describing increasing globalization of
media industry); Henry Kaufman, Why There Can Be No Alternative to the US dollar, FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 9, 2004, at 19 (analyzing general effects of increasing economic
globalization); Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1404, 1404 (2006) (book review) (discussing grow-
ing reach of international law in increasingly globalized world); Ruti Teitel, Comparative
Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2570, 2572 (2004) (book review)
(characterizing constitutional law as last frontier for globalism). A growing body of
scholarship has begun to address the issue of international law's influence in the
United States. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 191, 191 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Global Community] (describing rise in trans-
national litigation, which encompasses cases between States, between individuals and
States, and between individuals across borders, blurring traditional conception of inter-
national disputes as only existing between States); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Breard: Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 708-10 (1998) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Court to Court] (explaining concepts of judicial comity and transjudicial relations);
Reem Bahdi, Globalization ofJudgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International
Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 555, 557-58 (2002) (describing
process by which judges from different countries have begun communicating and
learning from one another); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 53 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, International Law as Our Law]
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of constitutional globalism claim that U.S. courts considering
difficult constitutional issues may benefit from the experiences
of constitutional courts and democratic legislatures around the
world.3 Opponents take the position that international sources4
are irrelevant and unconstitutional for U.S. courts to consider
when interpreting the U.S. Constitution.5
(describing form of "transnationalist jurisprudence" that recognizes emergence of
transnational law as result of increasingly globalized world); Claire L'Heureux-Dube,
The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court,
34 TULSA L.J. 15, 29-40 (1998) (noting increasing dialogue between international
courts). Although many non-U.S. constitutional courts routinely consult international
sources in deciding constitutional issues, the practice is controversial in U.S. courts. See
ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 15-25 (2003)
(characterizing trend towards interpreting U.S. Constitution with reference to interna-
tional sources as "insidious"); see also Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justifica-
tion: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 819
(1999) (noting dearth of comparative constitutional analysis in U.S. case law as com-
pared to other Nations); Sarah H. Cleveland, Is There Room for the World in Our Courts,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2005, at B5 (suggesting that ongoing disagreement over influence
of international law reflects U.S. Supreme CourtJustices' widely divergent opinions on
U.S. place in increasingly globalized world); Scott Malcomson, Lawfare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2004, § 6 (magazine), at 80 (highlighting U.S. politicians' criticism of increasing
globalization of U.S. Supreme Court decisions); Patti Waldmeir, Top Court Abolishes US
Death Penalty For Juveniles, FIN. TIMES (London), May 2, 2005, at 10 (noting controversy
over increased references to international sources in recent U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions).
3. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2005) (holding laws of other coun-
tries instructive for purposes of interpreting Eighth Amendment); see also Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that experiences of non-U.S. systems may assist in evaluating merits of proposed
solutions to common legal problems); Cleveland, supra note 2 (arguing that drafters of
U.S. Constitution expected some aspects of constitutional interpretation to be in-
formed by international norms); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond our Borders: The
Value of Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 329,
330-32 (2004) (stating that authors of Declaration of Independence and U.S. Constitu-
tion created documents reflecting their concern for world opinion); Harold Hongju H.
Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
1085, 1087-90 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, World Opinion] (asserting that Framers of U.S.
Constitution ("Framers") intended term "Law of Nations" to be enforceable as U.S.
law).
4. For the purposes of this Note, the terms "international sources," "international
materials," and "international law" will be used to describe the full range of non-U.S.
legal materials, including, but not limited to: international treaties or agreements; non-
U.S. constitutions, legislation, or case law; prevailing international opinion; and the
writings of non-U.S. jurists or legal experts.
5. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing use of international
law as unconstitutional); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.
dissenting) (claiming that constitutional entitlements cannot be created by practices of
other Nations); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that it is unconstitutional to apply non-U.S. law to U.S. citizens); Thompson v.
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Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions reflect this tension, as
Justices on both sides of the issue have expressed opinions on
the propriety of international law citations.6 Most recently, the
issue arose in Roper v. Simmons, a U.S. Supreme Court case that
reversed earlier cases,7 and held the death penalty to be an un-
constitutional punishment for juvenile offenders - those under
the age of eighteen at the time of their crime.' Though Ropers
holding is rooted in the established principles of the Court's
Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence, legal scholars have criticized
Okla., 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (stating that because there is
no discernable U.S. consensus against executing offenders under age of 16, fact that
majority of Nations prohibits such punishment is irrelevant).
6. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (stating that majority opinion holding execution
ofjuveniles unconstitutional "finds confirmation" in fact that United States is only re-
maining Nation sanctioning such punishment), and Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77 (citing
with approval European Court of Human Rights case striking down laws forbidding
consensual homosexual conduct), and Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (finding imposition
of death penalty on mentally retarded offenders "overwhelmingly disapproved" of in
world community), with Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that ac-
knowledgement of international laws or opinions is inappropriate in U.S. courts), and
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion's cita-
tion of non-U.S. opinions to be "meaningless" and "dangerous"), and Atkins, 536 U.S. at
322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that majority opinion's citation to non-U.S.
law "finds little support in our precedents and . . . is antithetical to considerations of
federalism"). See generally Waldmeir, supra note 2 (noting debate over citation of inter-
national law in recent U.S. Supreme Court cases).
7. Compare Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79 (holding juvenile death penalty unconstitu-
tional under Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment), with
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (upholding juvenile death penalty as
constitutional). See also Charles Lane, Kennedy Reversal Swings Court Against Juvenile Death
Penalty, WASH. PosT, Mar. 7, 2005, at Al7 (noting Justice Kennedy's change of mind on
constitutionality of juvenile death penalty).
8. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79 (holding U.S. Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to forbid imposing death penalty on offenders under age 18 at time of
crime); see also Douglass W. Cassell, Jr., Top Court Embraces a World View, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Mar. 4, 2005, at 5 (noting prominent role international opinion played in shap-
ing Roper decision).
9. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79 at 560-61 (stating that traditional formulation of
whether a law violates Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" has been to "consult the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society," as articulated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality
opinion)); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 (stating that U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence does not confine Eighth Amendment's definition of "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" to barbaric punishments generally outlawed in eighteenth century, instead has
interpreted Amendment in "flexible and dynamic manner") (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (stressing
that precise definition of cruel and unusual punishment has never been explicitly de-
fined, and that protections of Eighth Amendment may expand as public opinion
evolves).
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the decision's lengthy discussion of international law. 1° This crit-
icism quickly subsumed the initial debate over the constitutional-
ity of executing minors." Public reaction in the United States
remains deeply divided on the use of international law in U.S.
courts. 1 2 Indeed, the debate has existed since the founding of
the United States (the "Founding"), 3 and the outcome has the
10. See Opinion, Justices Out on a Limb, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 4, 2005, at B8
(praising abolition ofjuvenile death penalty, but lamenting Ropers reliance on interna-
tional law as dangerously illogical); see alsoJohn Leo, Double-Standard Trouble, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Mar. 28, 2005, at 67 (accusing U.S. Supreme Court of selectively invok-
ing international standards when it suits their political preferences); George Neumayr,
Constitution Killers, Am. SPECTATOR ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2005 (labeling Roper decision as "act
of despotism that masquerades as jurisprudence," and claiming that U.S. Supreme
Court is writing new U.S. Constitution, with non-U.S. citizens as co-authors), available at
http://www.spectator.org/dsp-article.asp?artjid=7841; Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Court, and
Foreign Friends, as Constitutional Convention, NAT. J., Mar. 5, 2005 (criticizing Roper for
reliance on international sources, and suggesting that this reliance may have developed
as result of some U.S. Supreme Court Justices vacationing in Europe).
11. See Roper 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming it is opinions of non-
U.S. countries taking center stage in Roper majority decision, not opinions of U.S. Su-
preme Court); see also Cassell, supra note 8, at 5 (mentioning that Roper was not just
about juvenile death penalty, but also about issue of international law's role in constitu-
tional interpretation); Julia A. Youngs, Editorial, Public Policy Imposed By Court, SEATrLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 2005, at B6 (agreeing with U.S. Supreme Court's prohibi-
tion on juvenile death penalty, but criticizing Roper's reliance on international law).
12. See, e.g., S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (expressing sense of U.S. Senate that
U.S. courts should not decide constitutional cases based on non-U.S. cases, laws, or
opinion, unless they "inform an understanding of the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion of the United States");John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?,
10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 48 (2000) (denouncing international law as
ineffective, trivial, and worthless); Peter Edelman, Time to Bench Judicial Activism, 'WASH.
POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at A25 (noting that Democrats and Republicans are both increas-
ingly using unpopular court decisions in their political stump speeches as effective tool
for motivating their political bases); Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense of Siege Is
Fueling a Resurgence; Onward Christian Soldiers, NATION, July 5, 2004, at 33 (describing
mobilization of Christian fundamentalists in reaction to Lawrence decision); Phyllis
Schlafly, Supreme Court Justices Need to Focus on U.S. Constitution, COPLEY NEWS Svc., Nov.
2, 2004 (suggesting that U.S. Supreme Court Justices who reference non-U.S. laws
should be impeached).
13. Compare Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857) (Taney, J.)
(claiming that views of Europeans on abhorrent nature of slavery are irrelevant to con-
siderations of whether practice is constitutional), with id. at 556-57 (McLean,J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that international laws regarding slavery should control, and that such
laws would classify Dred Scott as free man, not slave). See Steven G. Calabresi & Stepha-
nie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of
Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 Wm. & MARv L. REv. 743, 754 (2005)
(stating that debate over citation of non-U.S. law in U.S. court opinions is "not at all
new"); see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin, The Ghost of
Senator Bricker] (describing U.S. Congress's hostility to international law in 1950's).
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potential to shape future U.S. court decisions on a variety of im-
portant constitutional issues.14
Part I of this Note will review the influence of international
law in early U.S. history as well as the current practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court in citing international law, and will briefly ex-
plain how principles of international law are imported into U.S.
courtrooms. Part II will examine competing legal theories on
the proper role for international law in U.S. constitutional inter-
pretation. Part III will argue that although it is proper for U.S.
courts to reference international sources in their decisions, the
U.S. Supreme Court's current articulation of how courts should
do so is deeply flawed. Part III will conclude by recommending a
framework theory for how U.S. federal courts interpreting the
U.S. Constitution might properly utilize international law.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS
Using international law to interpret a national constitution
naturally raises important issues of sovereignty, and in the case
of the United States, invariably invites an analysis of historic
practice.15 Much about the way U.S. courts treat international
law has changed since the United States was a newly formed Na-
tion, devoid of a comprehensive judicial history.' 6 In the early
14. See Daniel Bodansky, Debate: The Use of International Sources in Constitutional
Opinion, 32 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 428 (2004) (noting utility of international law
in deciding close constitutional cases); see also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law,
and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1999, 2026-28 (2003) (explaining controversy
over U.S. courts' application of international norms in constitutional issues, suggesting
that in short run, such norms may serve to inform constitutional interpretation, and
contemplating future in which U.S. Constitution is subordinate to international
norms).
15. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on
Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 70 (2004) [hereinafter Ramsey, International
Materials] (stating that references to international sources in U.S. constitutional inter-
pretation is not new, nor is criticism that attends such references); see also Slaughter,
Global Community, supra note 2, at 195 n.l 1 (noting that Framers borrowed heavily from
judicial principles of English common law, as well as political theories of Age of Enlight-
enment). See generally Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justices, U.S. Supreme
Court, Discussion at the American University Washington College of Law: Debate on
the Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional Adjudication (Jan. 13,
2005), reprinted in The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A
Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L.
519 [hereinafter Scalia & Breyer] (debating history and relevance of international law
in U.S. judicial decisions).
16. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 822-26 (1997)
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years of the nineteenth century, when U.S. cultural, economic,
and military power was far from dominant, the U.S. Supreme
Court looked much more favorably upon international legal
sources than they do today.' 7 This Part will begin with an exami-
nation of how international law was perceived and utilized in
early U.S. history. This Part will then proceed to discuss the
basics of how international judge-made law is used in U.S.
courts, and will conclude by analyzing recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases citing international law.
A. U.S. Courts and International Law
The consultation of international sources in U.S. jurispru-
dence is not a new practice, nor is the criticism it engenders.' 8
(noting that conceptions of how international law interacts with U.S. law has changed
significantly over time); see also Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law:
A Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REv. 187, 196 (2001) [hereinafter Ramsey, Part of
Our Law] (asserting that there is much about U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of inter-
national law that has changed since 1789).
17. See Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 330 (noting favorable pronouncements of early
U.S. Supreme Court Justices on merits of respecting international law); see also Stanley
N. Katz, A New American Dilemma?: U.S. Constitutionalism vs. International Human Rights,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 324-26 (2003) (noting irony in development of U.S. constitu-
tional theory of textualism, which hinges upon fidelity to original text, having devel-
oped from British system, which relied on unwritten constitutional tenets); Koh, Inter-
national Law as Our Law, supra note 2, at 44 (stating that Framers of U.S. Constitution,
as well as early Justices of U.S. Supreme Court, recognized that ensuring compatibility
of U.S. law with rules of international law was essential to stability of their newly formed
Nation); Ramsey, Part of Our Law, supra note 16, at 196 (noting Framers' concern that
Articles of Confederation lacked power to prevent individual States from violating inter-
national law); Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 2, at 197 (noting that courts in
fledgling States or newly decolonized countries, such as post-Revolution United States,
have historically borrowed from laws of other countries to fill gaps or build legal foun-
dations).
18. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Virginia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793) (Wilson, J.)
(referencing "laws and practice of States and Kingdoms" in deciding whether a resident
of one state had standing to sue another state); Louis Henkin, International Law: Inter-
national Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559-60, 1569 (1984)
(stating that international law has been accepted as part of U.S. law since founding of
United States; therefore courts should continue to give effect to developments in inter-
national law); Jordan Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are
Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 301-05 (1999) (listing early U.S. cases
invoking law of nations). But see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 182
(1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority decision's reliance on non-U.S.
law in defining what constitutes piracy, and stating that U.S. Congress has duty "not to
refer the citizens of the United States for rules of conduct to the statutes or laws of any
foreign country"); Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 753-54 (cataloguing early U.S.
Supreme Court decisions referencing international law and noting early debates that
accompanied them).
2005] REASON WITHOUT BORDERS 1601
International law is explicitly referenced in several important
Founding documents: The Declaration of Independence aspires
to give "decent respect to the opinions of mankind,"'" and the
U.S. Constitution explicitly invokes international law by delegat-
ing to Congress the power to define and punish offenses against
the law of nations.2 ° In addition to these Founding documents,
early U.S. courts referenced international law in a variety of situ-
ations.2 '
1. Early U.S. Cases Citing International Law
Early U.S. history was marked by a series of naval conflicts.22
As a result, a number of early U.S. Supreme Court cases utilizing
international law dealt with issues of maritime law and the law of
war.21 In the cases described below, the Court looked to interna-
tional sources in determining questions of statutory interpreta-
tion, federal jurisdiction, and constitutional interpretation.
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776); see also Harry A. Black-
mun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address Before the Annual Dinner of the
American Society of International Law, in AM. Soc. ITr'L L. NEWSL., Mar. 1994 (sug-
gesting that language of U.S. Declaration of Independence indicates that drafters of
U.S. Constitution intended law of nations to be binding on United States).
20. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 (stating that "Congress shall have Power To ...
define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations . . . ."); id. art. III, § 2
(defining judicial power to exent to "all Cases ... arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority . . . ."); see also Paust, supra note 18, at 301 (arguing that Founders clearly
intended customary law of Nations to be supreme, binding law within United States).
21. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethink-
ing the Interpretive Role ofInternational Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479, 482 (1998) (explaining that
U.S. courts have relied on international law in interpreting U.S. federal law since found-
ing of the United States); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 757 (noting that
early U.S. Supreme Court decisions frequently referenced law of nations).
22. E.g., G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy
Cases, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 727 (1989) (explaining that early U.S. naval conflicts re-
sulted in proliferation of early piracy cases); see also C. Kevin Marshall, Note, Putting
Privateers in Their Place: The Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to Undeclared
Wars, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 953, 974-75 (1997) (noting that privateers captured boats with-
out much governmental oversight throughout early U.S. history; stating that U.S. courts
were often only meaningful check on privateers' actions).
23. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 758, 763-83 (arguing that Founders
intended international law to inform U.S. cases involving piracy and other heinous
crimes; reviewing numerous early U.S. Supreme Court cases utilizing international law
on subjects of piracy, prize, and law of war); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our Interna-
tional Constitution, 31 YALE J. INr'L L. 1, 19 (2006) (noting that international law has
informed U.S. law of war jurisprudence since Founding).
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a. The Charming Betsy: Statutory Interpretation
In 1804, fifteen years after the U.S. Constitution was ratified,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy.24 At the time, the United States was engaged in
an undeclared war with France: the U.S. Congress had passed a
law prohibiting trade with France, and U.S. President John Ad-
ams had ordered the U.S. Navy to capture vessels suspected of
engaging in commerce with France or any of its colonies.2" The
Danish-owned Charming Betsy was subsequently captured on sus-
picion of trading with the French, and brought to the United
States.2 6 The owner of the Charming Betsy sued for the return of
his boat, and the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which
held that the taking was unjustified under U.S. law, since it in-
volved a neutral Danish vessel. 27 Importantly, ChiefJustice John
Marshall looked to international legal principles - which coun-
seled against allowing the seizure of neutral vessels from non-
combatant countries - in interpreting the statute at issue.28 Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion articulated what has come to be known
as the Charming Betsy canon of construction: that an act of Con-
gress should never be construed to violate the law of nations if
there is any other possible interpretation.29
24. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(holding that U.S. law prohibiting trade with France was not violated by Dutch ship that
traded with French colonies); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 766 (char-
acterizing Charming Betsy decision as "giving legal weight" to international sources of
law).
25. See Federal Nonintercourse Act, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (expired 1801)
(stating that any U.S. ships caught doing business with France would be "wholly for-
feited," and could subsequently be "seized and condemned" in any U.S. court); see also
Bradley, supra note 21, at 485-87 (noting existence of undeclared war between United
States and France, passage of Federal Nonintercourse Act, and U.S. PresidentJohn Ad-
ams' order to U.S. Navy to capture boats suspected of involvement with French).
26. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 116-17 (noting that U.S. Navy captured
boat for suspected trade with French colony); see also Bradley, supra note 21, at 486
(explaining details surrounding capture of Charming Betsy by U.S. Navy).
27. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 120-21 (stating that Charming Betsy was
not forfeitable, since it was Danish-owned); see also Bradley, supra note 21, at 486-87
(noting challenge to Charming Betsy's seizure by original owner; explaining that U.S.
Supreme Court held seizure unjustified).
28. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (stating that acts of U.S. Congress
should be interpreted so as not to conflict with law of nations); see also Calabresi &
Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 766 (characterizing Charming Betsy decision as giving legal
significance to international sources of law)
29. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (holding that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construc-
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b. Rose v. Himely: Jurisdictional Interpretation
Four years later, the Court was presented with another case
involving a seized ship, and once again international law was in-
voked, this time to determine the scope of the Court's jurisdic-
tion. ° A French ship had captured a trading vessel carrying a
cargo of coffee owned by a U.S. citizen as it sailed from the
French colony of Santo Domingo to the United States." A
French tribunal in Santo Domingo condemned the captured ves-
sel and sold it to another U.S. citizen, who transported the cof-
fee to South Carolina, where the original U.S. owner subse-
quently brought suit to recover the cargo. 2 The case reached
the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether U.S. courts
had jurisdiction to examine the findings of non-U.S. courts or
tribunals - in this case, the French tribunal in Santo Dom-
ingo.3' The Supreme Court examined contemporaneous En-
glish cases addressing the ability of English courts to review the
judgments of non-English tribunals.3 4  Each English case con-
firmed the Court's ultimate holding - that they did indeed
tion remains"); see also Bradley, supra note 21, at 485-86 (noting that Charming Betsy
canon had been articulated three years earlier in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1
(1801)). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 114 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (adopting Charming
Betsy canon of construction).
30. See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 268, 270-71 (1808) (examining con-
temporaneous British cases to determine whether there was jurisdiction for U.S. courts
to examine judgments of non-U.S. tribunals); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note
13, at 769 (stating that Rose v. Himely clearly relied upon contemporaneous British case
law in deciding question of jurisdiction).
31. See Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 268 (recounting capture of U.S. cargo by French
authorities and subsequent resale to U.S. defendant); see also G. Edward White, Recover-
ing the World of the Marshall Court, 33J. MARSHALL L. REv. 781, 788 n.21 (noting that Rose
was one of many complicated jurisdictional cases decided when there were many ships
from belligerent and neutral countries sailing through ocean near United States).
32. See Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 268 (explaining that French tribunal in Santo
Domingo condemned ship and resold its cargo); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra
note 13, at 766 (noting that case involved seizure of U.S.-owned cargo by French au-
thorities).
33. See Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 268 (noting that "the great question to be de-
cided . . . is .... [c]an this court examine the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal?"); see
also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 766 (explaining that Rose involved "a ques-
tion of jurisdiction and a seized vessel").
34. See Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270-72 (citing English court cases such as The Flad
Oyen, The Christopher, The Kierlighett, The Henrick and Maria, and The Comet, each of which
reviewed decisions of non-English tribunals); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note
13, at 767 (noting that Rose discussed several contemporary English cases in coming to a
decision).
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have jurisdiction to evaluate the validity of decisions made by
non-U.S. tribunals. 5
c. Brown v. United States: Constitutional Interpretation
In addition to statutory interpretation and jurisdictional in-
terpretation, early U.S. Supreme Court decisions also used inter-
national sources as an aid in constitutional interpretation. 6 In
Brown v. United States, the U.S. Government had seized a cargo of
lumber that had been purchased by a U.S. citizen from a British
seller just prior to the War of 1812.3' The U.S. purchaser sued,
and the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the seizure, interpret-
ing the War Clause of the U.S. Constitution - which gives Con-
gress the power to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land
and Water '38 - by reference to the writings of a number of non-
U.S. jurists.39 The Court found that the power to declare war
required congressional authorization, which had been given, but
that seizure of property within the United States required a sepa-
rate congressional authorization - it was not implicit in a decla-
ration of war.40 In other words, the Court looked to the writings
of non-U.S. legal scholars and the law of nations to interpret the
35. See Rose, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 270-72 (examining English cases in determining
whether U.S. Supreme Court had power to review determinations of French tribunal
regarding seizure of U.S. cargo ship; noting that English cases establish that English
courts may examine jurisdictional competency of non-English tribunals); see also Cala-
bresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 767 (concluding that Rose v. Himely was "clear exam-
ple" of early U.S. Supreme Court giving legal weight to non-U.S. law).
36. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 123-27 (1814) (inter-
preting Article I, section 8, clause 11, of U.S. Constitution ("War Clause") with refer-
ence to international law); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 770-71 (using
Brown as example of early U.S court using international law to interpret U.S. Constitu-
tion).
37. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 121-22 (describing seizure of cargo purchased
by U.S. citizen prior to War of 1812); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 771
(stating that Brown interpreted U.S. Constitution in way that "would accord with the law
of nations").
38. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 126 (utilizing law of nations to interpret War
Clause); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 770 (noting that Brown held that
declaration of war does not serve as permission for executive to confiscate property).
39. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 124-25 (citing writings of non-U.S.jurists such
as Bynkershoek, Chitty, and Vattel, for proposition that seizure of property during war-
time, even enemy property, is not directly related to declaration of war); see also Cala-
bresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 770 (describing Brown's reliance on non-U.S. jurists).
40. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125-26 (stating that a declaration of war "has
only the effect of placing the two nations in a state of hostility," but does not automati-
cally allow seizures of enemy property); see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for
the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rv. 293, 296
2005] REASON WITHOUT BORDERS 1605
scope and power of the War Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 '
2. How International Law Interacts With U.S. Courts
Over the years, what was once referred to as 'the law of na-
tions' has become synonymous with the term 'customary interna-
tional law' ("CIL"), a body of often unwritten law that must be
interpreted and applied by U.S. courts.4 2 Today, the two major
types of international law applied in U.S. courtrooms are CIL
and international agreements.4" Both have historically influ-
enced U.S. judicial decisions in cases dealing with subjects such
as diplomatic immunity, the law of war, and piracy." For the
purposes of this Note, only CIL, an entirely judicially-created
form of federal law, will be analyzed.45 Because the creation of
n.10 (2005) (noting that Brown held that U.S. President could not confiscate private
property without specific congressional authorization).
41. See Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 125-26 (warning that U.S. Constitution should
not be interpreted as defining established rules of war different from those of other
Nations); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 771 (explaining that Brown
construed War Clause so as not to conflict with international norms of warfare).
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § I reporters' note 5 (declaring CIL
and treaties to be supreme over laws of U.S. states); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 16, at 819 (noting that modern CIL is directly descended from law of nations);
Paust, supra note 18, at 301-05 (equating "Law of Nations" with CIL, and giving numer-
ous examples of early applications of CIL in U.S. courts); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393,
393-96 (1997) (noting that traditionally, CIL has been considered similar in status to
non-general common law after Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938): legally
binding federal law developed by federal courts in absence of statutory guidance). But
see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 857 (questioning validity of previous scholar-
ship on CIL and claiming that CIL is no longer valid after Erie decision); Patrick Kelly,
The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 452 (2000) (arguing
for abolition of CIL). Contra Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Na-
tions, 104 Yale LJ. 39, 40 (1994) (stating that, despite debate on some issues of interna-
tional law's power, it is clear that "[c] ustomary international law informs the construc-
tion of domestic law," and is controlling in absence of superseding law to contrary);
Stephens, supra, at 396-98 (rebutting criticism of CIL as misleading and incorrect).
43. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) (recognizing power
of executive agreements); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, intro. (noting
that most international law mentioned in Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States ("Restatement (Third)") comes from CIL and international agree-
ments); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 817 & n.10 (listing CIL and interna-
tional agreements as primary sources of international law utilized by U.S. courts).
44. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (noting that early U.S.
Congress provided remedies for violations of at least three aspects of law of nations:
offenses against ambassadors, piracy, and violation of safe conduct); see also White, supra
note 22, at 734-35.
45. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715 (noting that in early U.S. history, law of nations in-
cluded "a body of judge-made law" which carried "an international savor"); see also
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international agreements - such as executive agreements, trade
agreements, or treaties - are created by (or with input from)
the executive or legislative branches of the U.S. government,
they are less helpful in illustrating the debate over the use of
international sources in U.S. judicial decisions.4 6 Historically, in-
ternational law norms were most often used to resolve disagree-
ments between Nations, a kind of international stare decisis that
U.S. courts distilled from the customs and usages of civilized Na-
tions, international treaties, opinions of eminent statespersons,
ordinances of non-U.S. States, text-writers of authority, and writ-
ings of distinguished jurists.4 7 The latter half of the twentieth
century, however, has seen the birth of the "human rights era,"
which is marked by an expanding body of human rights cases
referencing international law.48 As international law49 is increas-
ingly used to regulate how Nations deal with their own citizens,5"
a number of landmark U.S. cases involving constitutional issues
relating to affirmative action, the death penalty, and sexual ori-
entation have relied in part on international law.5 ' These cases
Kelly, supra note 42, at 527 (criticizing CIL as undemocratic because it is made by
judges rather than legislatures). But see Henkin, supra note 18, at 1565 (describing pro-
cess of discerning CIL as more akin to process of "finding" rather than "creating").
46. See U.S. CONST., art. I1, § 2, cl. 2 (laying out treaty ratification process); see also
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 817-18 (contrasting CIL and treaty power).
47. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-01 (1900) (quoting WHEATON'S
INTERNATIoNAL LAw, (8th ed.) § 15) (listing sources to be consulted in deriving interna-
tional law); see also Henkin, supra note 18, at 1561 (noting that federal courts derive
precepts of international law from political actions of Nations of world, not from their
own judgments or U.S. legal precedent).
48. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 728-29 (2004) (Souter, J.) (stating that in
future, courts may continue to recognize evolving norms of international law); see also
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding certain types of conduct
violative of law of Nations, whether undertaken by government officials or as private
citizens); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding practice of
torture by government officials to violate principles of CIL).
49. Because the scope of this Note does not encompass international agreements
or treaties, the terms "international law" and CIL are used interchangeably throughout.
50. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d. Cir. 1980) (interpreting CIL
as prohibitive of torture, also sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction in case
awarding damages to family whose son was tortured and killed in Paraguay by
Paraguayan military official); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 840-41 (as-
serting that content of CIL has changed, expanding since World War Two ("WWII") to
provide redress to individuals in human rights cases).
51. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (citing international sources to
discern worldwide consensus against executing juvenile offenders); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (noting worldwide trend against constitutionality of
laws criminalizing consensual adult sexual relations); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
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have been criticized 52 by commentators who point out that inter-
national legal norms have historically been invoked in cases con-
cerning matters of foreign policy, rather than in cases dealing
with individual human rights,5 ' and claim that modern U.S.
courts have given international law too much power. 54 Despite
this criticism, however, a growing community of academics,
judges, and litigators support the judicial practice of consulting
international law, not only as consistent with the intent of the
Framers of the U.S. Constitution, but also as a necessary compo-
nent of a successful modern judicial system in an increasingly
globalized world.
a. Judicially-Defined International Law
In the absence of an explicit constitutional provision, legis-
lation, or treaty, a Nation may still be bound by CIL, a set of
344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (examining worldwide consensus in favor of af-
firmative action); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (considering world-
wide consensus against punishing mentally retarded offenders with death penalty).
52. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing majority opin-
ion's discussion of non-U.S. opinions as "meaningless dicta," but also as "[d] angerous
dicta . . . since this court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads or fashions on
Americans.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re-
public, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (stating that U.S. trea-
ties generally do not create privately enforceable rights in U.S. courts); Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 16, at 817 (criticizing jurisprudential theories that consider CIL as
powerful as federal law). See generally Ramsey, Part of Our Law, supra note 16, at 191-94
(providing overview of legal theories that seek to exclude international law from U.S.
courts).
53. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813-814 (Bork, J., concurring) (claiming that interna-
tional law was historically only invoked in order to avoid conflicts with other Nations,
such as in cases involving ambassadors or in piracy cases); see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 16, at 873-76 (criticizing use of international law in human rights cases as
without precedent).
54. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitu-
tionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91, 93
(2004) (describing increasing power of CIL); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
16, at 821 (claiming that CIL now regulates many areas of law that were traditionally left
to national governments to control).
55. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163 (D.C. Cir., 2004) (stating
that U.S. policy of denying enemy combatants their rights under Geneva Convention
endangers U.S. citizens captured abroad by non-U.S. countries, who may be denied
their rights as retaliation); see also Paust, supra note 18, at 335-36 (claiming that Framers,
text, and structure of U.S. Constitution, along with overwhelming patterns of legal ex-
pectation since beginning of United States support current trend in judicial decision
making utilizing CIL as law of United States); Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, FoR-
EIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9 (arguing that forces of economic globalism will eventu-
ally force United States to accept international legal and human rights norms).
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international rules,5 6 derived through the general and consistent
practice of Nations, and conducted with a sense of legal obliga-
tion.57 As the cases discussed above show, international law was
used by early U.S. courts as an interpretive aid for a variety of
legal issues. Over the years, U.S. courts and legal scholars have
concluded that CIL, as the modern equivalent of the law of na-
tions, has the power of federal common law- judge-made fed-
eral rules - in U.S. courts.58
i. Customary International Law ("CIL")
An early application of CIL - known at the time as the "law
of nations" - in U.S. courts occurred in 1900, in The Paquete
Habana.59 During the Spanish-American war, U.S. President Wil-
liam McKinley issued a Proclamation stating that enemy vessels
could be seized as prizes of war according to the rules set forth
in the law of nations.6 ° Pursuant to this Proclamation, a U.S.
gunboat seized the Paquete Habana, a small fishing vessel, along
the coast of Cuba.6' Over the objections of the owner and crew,
the Paquete Habana was taken to Key West, Florida, where it was
56. See Aleinikoff, supra note 54, at 93 & n.14 (discussing controversy over theory
that United States might be bound by CIL norms it has not assented to); see also Kelly,
supra note 42, at 451 (arguing that CIL should be abolished because it is undemocratic
and difficult to apply). See generally Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 369 (2002) (noting possibility, before Roper was
decided, that if CIL has status of federal law, then state death penalty statutes might be
preempted by federal law).
57. See RESTATEMENr (THIRD), supra note 29, § 102(2)-(3) (noting that term "opinio
juris" is often used interchangeably with "a sense of legal obligation" when discussing
CIL, and that international agreements or treaties can serve to create CIL when widely
ratified); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 817-18 (providing overview of
how CIL is created).
58. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730-31 (2004) (discussing status of
CIL as federal common law); see also Stephens, supra note 42, at 394-95 (stating that view
of CIL as equivalent to federal common law has become widely accepted).
59. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 709 (1900) (holding law of nations to
forbid seizure of coastal fishing vessels as prizes of war); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 IHARv. L. REv. 1824, 1842 (1998) (citing The
Paquete Habana as example of early U.S. courts using CIL)
60. See Presidential Proclamation, 30 Star. 1769 (Apr. 22, 1898) (authorizing block-
ade of Cuba in pursuance of U.S. law and law of nations); see also Steven M.
Schneebaum, The Paquete Habana Sails On: International Law in U.S. Courts After Sosa,
19 EMORy INT'L L. REv. 81, 81 (2005) (noting that Presidential Proclamation ordering
U.S. ships to seize Spanish ships violating blockade of Cuba was made days before out-
break of Spanish-American War).
61. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 678-79 (recounting details of seizure); see
also Schneebaum, supra note 60, at 81 (noting seizure of Paquete Habana by U.S. vessel).
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condemned and sold as a prize of war.6 2 The owners of the boat
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was asked to decide
if the law of nations had been violated.6" The Court engaged in
a lengthy exploration of what would now be considered CIL, an-
alyzing the customary treatment of coastal fishing vessels in times
of war, and concluded that such vessels were exempt from cap-
ture as prizes of war. 6' In its opinion, the Court issued the often-
cited declaration that " [i] nternational law is part of our law."6
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (the "Restatement (Third)") explains that a consistent prac-
tice among a majority of Nations eventually ripens into a princi-
ple of CIL, which, much like a multilateral treaty, creates obliga-
tions among States.66 Unlike treaties, however, CIL principles
require no promulgation or ratification by the executive or legis-
lative branches of the U.S. Government; instead, they are
formed by the political actions of the Nations of the world.6 7
U.S. judges then determine and apply CIL, which has the force
62. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 679 (noting that Paquete Habana was con-
demned in Key West and sold for US$490); see also Michael J. Glennon, Raising The
Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitu-
tional, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 321, 322 (1985) (noting that Paquete Habana was condemned
and sold as prize of war despite its owners' legal objections).
63. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686 (characterizing issue to be decided as
whether Cuban coastal fishing boats were subject to capture by U.S. vessels as prizes of
war); see also Glennon, supra note 62, at 322 (noting that The Paquete Habana opinion
involved lengthy analysis of international law).
64. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686 (stating that prohibition on seizure of
coastal fishing vessels began as "an ancient usage among civilized nations" and had
ripened into a rule of international law); see also Glennon, supra note 62, at 322 (ex-
plaining that The Paquete Habana has become leading case concerning incorporation of
international norms into U.S. law).
65. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (holding that traditional prohibition
against seizing coastal fishing vessels had ripened from principle of comity into settled
principle of international law); see also Henkin, supra note 18, at 1555 (stating that when
decided, holding of The Paquete Habana was uncontroversial, since it was "merely restat-
ing what had been established principle for the fathers of American jurisprudence and
for their British legal ancestors").
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRo), supra note 29, § 102 cmt. b (observing that failure of
significant numbers of "important" States to adopt certain practice may prevent princi-
ple from becoming accepted part of CIL); see also Henkin, supra note 18, at 1561-62
(arguing that in some senses, federal judges "find" CIL rather than "create" it).
67. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 1562 (claiming that courts determine CIL norms
by looking to political actions of State governments); see also Donald J. Kochan, The
Political Economy of the Production of Customary International Law: The Role of Non-govern-
mental Organizations in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEYJ. Ir'L L. 240, 260-63 (2004) (noting
growing role of non-governmental organizations in creation of new CIL norms).
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of federal common law - judge-made rules of decision -
though whether it is fully equivalent to federal common law is
debatable. 68 According to the Restatement (Third), the following
human rights violations have "ripened" into CIL norms, and are
prohibited: a consistent pattern of violating internationally rec-
ognized human rights, genocide, murder, prolonged arbitrary
detention, slavery, systematic racial discrimination, and tor-
ture .69
ii. Jus Cogens Norms
Among the most well-established tenets of CIL are jus cogens
norms, also known as "peremptory norms" of international law.7"
These norms generally encompass types of human rights viola-
tions recognized as the most heinous crimes defined by CIL,
such as genocide or slavery.7 They are considered non-dero-
gable duties - duties which cannot be violated - that can be
modified only by subsequent jus cogens norms, and summarily
void any international agreements or treaties that conflict with
them.7 2 According to jus cogens, certain CIL norms - codified
or otherwise - can bind States if they have ripened into a wide-
68. See Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Constitutional?, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321, 347 (1985) (not-
ing that although U.S. courts have only recently equated CIL with federal common law,
they have always considered law of nations to be U.S. law); Henkin, supra note 18 at
1561-63 (describing similarities, differences between federal common law and CIL); see
also Paust, supra note 18, at 301 (stating that CIL has historically been construed as
having power of federal common law).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 702 cmt a. (noting that list of CIL
norms is not necessarily complete, and is open to creation of new human rights); see also
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 834-38 (noting that Restatement (Third) attributes
more power to CIL than previous Restatements).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 102 cmt. k (defining jus cogens
norms as rules of international law permitting no derogation, and which "prevail over
and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict
with themn"); see also A. Mark Weisburd, AmericanJudges and International Law, 36 VAND.J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1475, 1488 (2003) (noting that jus cogens norms are considered most
powerful of CIL norms).
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 702 cmt. n (including genocide and
slavery among jus cogens norms); see also Weisburd,. supra note 70, at 1488 (noting that
jus cogens norms apply to most heinous types of human rights violations).
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 702 cmt. n (defining jus cogens
norms as non-derogable duties); see also Weisburd, supra note 70, at 1488-89 (conclud-
ing that jus cogens norms are accepted as class of rules of international law from which
States are not permitted to derogate).
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spread international consensus.73 For instance, until Roper was
decided, there was significant debate over whether the U.S. pol-
icy of executing juveniles violated jus cogens norms, as the prac-
tice is condoned by only a handful of countries in the entire
world."4 On the other hand, the acceptance of same-sex mar-
riage as a fundamental right has likely not achieved the ex-
tremely demanding "widespread consensus" requirement neces-
sary for classification as a jus cogens norm.75 Like CIL norms, jus
cogens norms are treated like federal common law in U.S.
courts.7 6
Despite the Restatement (Third) definition of CIL and jus
cogens norms, and the application of CIL in a number of human
rights cases in the United States,77 the process by which these
principles are discerned remains uncertain. 78 Part of this uncer-
tainty arises from the premise that a significant number of im-
portant States may prevent norms from forming, by refusing to
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 102 cmt. b (stating that rules of
international law may be formed by widespread international consensus among Na-
tions); see also id. § 102 cmt. k (noting that jus cogens norms, once formed, cannot be
superceded by contrary international agreements); Paust, supra note 18, at 305 (assert-
ing that U.S. courts are bound by developments of CIL).
74. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-77 (noting almost unanimous prohibi-
tion on execution of juveniles in world community); see also Koh, International Law as
Our Law, supra note 2, at 52 (noting, before Roperwas decided, that U.S. Supreme Court
might use international consensus against juvenile death penalty as one factor in decid-
ing issue).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 702 cmt n. (identifying genocide,
murder, and slavery as jus cogens norms, but notably leaving out gender discrimination,
prolonged arbitrary detention, repeated patterns of gross human rights abuses, right to
property, systematic racial or religious discrimination, and torture); see also id. § 702
cmt. a (leaving open possibility that new rights may achieve status of CIL, and presuma-
bly jus cogens, in future); see also Koh, International Law as Our Law, supra note 2, at 52
(speculating that U.S. Supreme Court may, in future, rely on worldwide consensus
against death penalty to strike down death penalty as unconstitutional).
76. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 463, 512 (1997) (explaining
that Jus cogens norms are incorporated into federal common law); see alsoJoel R. Paul,
The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary International Law?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 469 n.25 (notingjus cogens and CIL as equivalent to U.S. federal common
law).
77. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that some
types of conduct violates law of Nations, regardless of whether undertaken by State
officials or private citizens); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding State-sanctioned torture a violation of CIL).
78. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 1566 (admitting that "[t]he process by which
[CIL] is created is hardly certain"); see also Kelly, supra note 42, at 450 (noting lack of
common understanding or agreement on formation process for CIL).
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participate in a given practice.79 In addition to CIL's uncertain
formation process, some commentators regard it as an elitist
concept: Because "text-writers of authority" are consulted when
a judge seeks to determine CIL, some critics argue that particu-
larly influential law professors' theories on CIL are often used by
U.S. courts in their determination of what the content of CIL
actually is.8 ° These two persistent veins of criticism undergird
the dominant objection: that because CIL principles may be
heavily influenced by the actions of non-U.S. governments and
legal scholars outside the United States, its application in U.S.
courts is undemocratic."'
b. Federal Common Law and CIL
To fully understand the use of these judicially-formed inter-
national law principles in U.S. courts, one must first understand
the basic workings of federal common law. Federal common law
may be defined as U.S. federal law created by a U.S. court (usu-
ally a federal court) when the substance of the rule is not clearly
suggested by the text of federal or constitutional law.8 2 The
modern concept of federal common law arose in the wake of the
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 102 cmt. d. (explaining that although
States may be bound by CIL without their explicit consent, "a [S]tate that indicates its
dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of development is not bound
by that rule even after it matures"); see also Curtis Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and
International Law, 52 DuKEa LJ. 485, 492 (2002) (claiming that United States has "opted
out" of worldwide consensus against juvenile death penalty).
80. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 836 (criticizing Restatement (Third),
written in part by Professor Louis Henkin, as method of "bootstrapping," because it
cites Henkin's own scholarly writings as part of a determination of what legal subjects
had reached "consensus" in international community); see also Bolton, supra note 12, at
7 (deriding notion of international norms distilled from writings of academics).
81. See Weisburd, supra note 70, at 1479 (criticizing formula federal courts use to
derive CIL because it "essentially converts law professors into philosopher kings" who
then "impose their ideas of what the law should be under the guise of describing the
law's content"); see also Bolton, sup-a note 12, at 7 (criticizing CIL as too reliant upon
personal opinions ofjudges). But see Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 Am.
J. INT'L L. 843, 847 (2001) (claiming that as most powerful Nation in world, United
States effectively can halt development of any new CIL norms by simply not participat-
ing in their development).
82. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 883, 890 (1986) (providing definition of federal common law); see also HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003) (reiterat-
ing Field's definition of federal common law as federal rules of decision that cannot be
traced directly to federal statutes or constitutional commands) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
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well-known case, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,8" which directed U.S.
federal courts to apply state law to controversies which were not
explicitly governed by federal statutes or Constitutional provi-
sions.84 Erie put an end to the generalized common law that had
up to that point been used by U.S. federal courts to overcome
the laws of U.S. states under the regime of Swift v. Tyson.8"
What is less well-known, and what is more important for the
purposes of this Note, is how Erie's legal revolution affected the
treatment of international law in U.S. courts.8 6 One year after
Erie was decided, Philip C. Jessup recognized the importance of
examining what effect its holding might have on international
law.87 Jessup warned that if Erie's prohibition on federal com-
mon law was interpreted broadly, it would mean U.S. state courts
would be left to interpret issues of international law - an unde-
sirable outcome, in his opinion.88
Although Erie dispensed with the conception of a genera-
lized federal common law, it left behind a body of federal, judge-
made law, known as "specialized" federal common law.89 An ex-
83. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (declaring that "[e]xcept in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the [s]tate"); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note
16, at 827 (noting that Erie ended federal court creation of general common law).
84. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (holding that U.S. federal courts must apply state law
principles to cases not involving federal statutes or the U.S. Constitution); see also Field,
supra note 82, at 885 (noting that Erie held that federal courts must use state law where
there is no federal or constitutional basis for decision).
85. Swiftv. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding federal, not state interpreta-
tion of common law to be supreme); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 82, at 628
(explaining that under Swift, U.S. federal courts looked to general principles of federal
law, rather than state law, in deciding numerous cases).
86. Compare Stephens, supra note 42, at 399 (stating that Erie decision played im-
portant role in defining CIL as federal common law), with Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 16, at 817 (arguing that post-Erie, CIL should not be considered as federal com-
mon law).
87. See Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to Interna-
tional Law, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 740, 741 (stating that Erie addressed only domestic law, not
international law); see also Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 827 (noting that mod-
ern conception of international law as specialized federal common law is founded upon
Jessup's argument).
88. SeeJessup, supra note 87, at 742 (explaining why Erie decision should not be
read as affecting interpretations of international law); see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 16, at 827 (noting Jessup's opposition to interpreting Erie as applying to
international law).
89. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-30 (noting that even after Erie decision, there exist
"limited enclaves" of judge-created federal common law); see also HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 82, at 685 (stating that "there is no longer serious dispute" that federal law
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ample of "specialized" federal common law can be seen in
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, which concerned a dispute
over a forged check that had been drawn on the U.S. Treasury.9"
Because there was no federal law on the subject, the U.S. District
Court hearing the case assumed that under the Erie doctrine,
state law would apply.9 On appeal, however, the Supreme
Court held that Erie did not apply, and looked instead to judi-
cially-created federal common law rules for deciding disputes in-
volving U.S. commercial paper.9 2 The Court explained that be-
cause the case implicated serious federal concerns (the ability to
issue U.S. Treasury checks) that originated from the text of the
U.S. Constitution, it fell within the narrow category of cases that
were still governed by specialized, judge-made federal common
law. 93
Clearfield Trust has been followed by many cases in which
federal courts have fashioned federal common law, though legal
scholars still debate just when it is appropriate for a court to ap-
ply federal common law rather than state law.94 In Textile Workers
encompasses judge-made law); HenryJ. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Fed-
eral Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405 (1964) (explaining that Erie decision,
which denied existence of generalized federal common law, led to development of
"specialized" federal common law).
90. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (stating
that Erie doctrine does not apply to cases involving vital U.S. interests, such as cases
involving U.S. commercial paper); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 82, at 696
(explaining that Clearfield and numerous later cases have fashioned body of specialized
federal common law).
91. See Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366 (recounting lower court's decision to apply
Pennsylvania law, rather than federal common law, in determining dispute over forged
check drawn on U.S. Treasury); see also Field, supra note 82, at 908-09 (noting that in
Clearfied, U.S. Supreme Court applied a rule of federal common law rather than state
law).
92. See Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366 (stating that Erie rule did not apply because
case involved exercise of constitutional function); see also Field, supra note 82, at 908
(explaining that U.S. Supreme Court held state law inapplicable in Clearfield because
uniform federal rule for business transactions was needed).
93. See Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367 (explaining that in absence of Congressional
Act, federal courts must fashion rule governing commercial transactions with constitu-
tional implications); see also Friendly, supra note 89, at 409 (identifying Clearfield as ex-
pressing theory of specialized federal common law).
94. Compare Field, supra note 82, at 883 (stating that federal common law can be
used by U.S. courts whenever they interpret a federal law or Constitutional provision to
authorize it), and Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805
(1989) (interpreting federal common law broadly, as appropriate whenever Constitu-
tion authorizes federal legislative or executive action), with Alfred Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1025-26
2005] REASON WITHOUT BORDERS 1615
v. Lincoln Mills, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the procedure
for determining federal common law.9 5 Lincoln Mills involved
the interpretation of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 ("Taft-Hartley Act"), a federal statute which allowed U.S.
federal courts to hear labor disputes. 96 The dispute was between
a union and its employer, who had entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement that specified arbitration as the final solution
for grievances. 9 7 When the union requested arbitration, the em-
ployer claimed that there was no federal or state remedy grant-
ing such relief, and a federal appellate court agreed.98 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court admitted that there was no explicit fed-
eral remedy addressing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, but declined to follow the command of Erie that in
the absence of a federal law, state law must be applied.99 In-
stead, the Court held that the Taft-Hartley Act implicitly author-
ized federal courts to apply federal common law to enforce col-
(1967) (arguing that U.S. Constitution authorizes federal common lawmaking in only
four areas: admirality, international relations, interstate controversies, and proprietary
U.S. transactions), and Thomas Merrill, TheJudicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 330-
31 (1992) (defining federal common lawmaking power narrowly; claiming that U.S.
courts can use federal common law only when explicitly authorized by Congress).
95. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449 (1957) (noting that case
involved question of whether Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("Taft-Hartley
Act") allowed federal courts to apply judge-made rules on enforceability of collective
bargaining agreements, or whether they were required to apply state law); see also Field,
supra note 82, at 909-10 (noting that Lincoln Mills decision interpreted Taft-Hartley Act
as allowing federal courts to fashion common law rules to enforce collective bargaining
agreements).
96. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449-50 (citing language of Taft-Hartley Act al-
lowing labor disputes to be brought into federal courts); see also Friendly, supra note 89,
at 412 (noting that Congress gave federal judges power to fashion body of federal con-
tract principles through passage of Taft-Hartley Act).
97. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449 (noting that case involved dispute between
union and employer over arbitration agreement); see also Paul Lund, The Decline of Fed-
eral Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rv. 895, 927-28 (1996) (explaining that Lincoln Mills
arose from dispute between union and employer over enforcement of arbitration agree-
ment).
98. See Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers, 230 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that although Taft-Hartley Act gave federal courts jurisdiction
to hear labor disputes, in absence of express federal statute, agreements to arbitrate
could not be specifically enforced); see also Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449 (noting refusal
of employer to submit to arbitration at request of union).
99. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449 (refusing to apply state common law rule
against enforcement of arbitration contracts; applying federal common law rule in-
stead); see also Lund, supra note 97, at 928-29 (explaining that although state law would
normally govern in case like Lincoln Mills, Supreme Court instead interpreted Taft-
Hartley Act to authorize application of judicially-created federal common law rules).
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lective bargaining agreements. 00 The proper rule, the Court
stated, would be fashioned by federal courts, through an analysis
of the objectives of the Taft-Hartley Act. 1 ' Importantly, Lincoln
Mills explained that in formulating federal common law, federal
courts would look to state law if it is "compatible with the pur-
pose" of the federal objective, and that any state law applied
would be "absorbed as federal law." 1" 2 Effectively, Lincoln Mills
articulated the principle that in determining the content of fed-
eral common law, federal courts have the power to choose
among competing rules of decision, or to formulate their own
rules, so long as the solution fits within the spirit of the overrid-
ing federal or constitutional objective."0 3
Like federal common law, which is not derived from explicit
congressional statutes, CIL is not derived from the explicit lan-
guage of international treaties. 10 4 Just as federal common law is
determined by an examination of the underlying purpose of the
federal interest at issue, CIL is found by looking to the practice
of Nations in formulating international rules.'0 5 Both federal
100. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51 (stating that Taft-Hartley Act "authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law" to enforce provisions of collective bar-
gaining agreements); see also Field, supra note 82, at 909-10 (explaining that Supreme
Court interpreted federal legislation to allow for creation of federal common law rules
enforcing arbitration agreements).
101. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57 (stating that federal courts would create
rule by looking to policy objectives of Taft-Hartley Act); see also Friendly, supra note 89,
at 412 (claiming that Congress mandated federal judges to fashion rules consistent with
federal labor statutes rather than follow state labor statutes).
102. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 (explaining that federal common law principles
regarding labor disputes may be determined by looking to state law rules, but that such
state laws will not be dispositive in formation of federal rules); see also Stephen L. Hay-
ford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening the Law of Labor Arbitra-
tion, 21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 521, 572-73 (2000) (noting that Lincoln Mills directed
U.S. federal courts to utilize "the range ofjudicial inventiveness" in determining federal
common law rules).
103. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57 (stating that federal common law will be
fashioned by looking to purpose of federal government);see also Hayford, supra note
102, at 572-73 (positing that Lincoln Mills directed U.S. federal courts to fashion federal
common law rules in labor disputes in accordance with national labor objectives).
104. See Field, supra note 82, at 883 (explaining that U.S. federal common law
principles are not found in explicit statutory or constitutional text); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 102(2) (explaining that CIL is formed by "general and
consistent practice of [S]tates followed by them from a sense of legal obligation").
105. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57 (noting that federal courts formulating
federal common law rules will be guided by federal policy objectives); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 29, § 102(2) (stating that CIL is determined by looking to
practice of Nations of the world).
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common law and CIL are unique aspects of federal law; both are
determined by judges, not legislatures, and both act to preempt
contradictory state law.1° 6
B. Recent U.S. Cases Citing International Law
Today, when the United States is one of the few remaining
military superpowers and U.S. constitutional jurisprudence is
among the most influential in the world,"°7 it is unclear what
role the laws and legal theories of other Nations should play in
U.S. legal decisions.1"8 Roper is the third in a series of recent
Supreme Court decisions that highlight the debate over the
proper scope and power attributed to international law in U.S.
constitutional cases.10 ' Ropers predecessors include Atkins v. Vir-
106. See Field, supra note 82, at 883 (noting that federal common law is deter-
mined by U.S. judges and preempts state law); see also Paust, supra note 18, at 305
(claiming that CIL, as determined by U.S. judges, is both federal law and supreme law
of the land).
107. See Amy C. Harfeld, Oh Righteous Delinquent One: The United States' International
Human Rights Double Standard - Explanation, Example, and Avenues for Change, 4 N.Y.
CrrY L. REv. 59, 68-69 (2001) (noting that since fall of Soviet Union, United States has
become primary world political and economic power); see also Vagts, supra note 81, at
847 (criticizing U.S. pattern of abstention from CIL norms, claiming that as world's
most powerful Nation, such norms can not develop without U.S. approval); Paul W.
Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International
Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2000) (claiming United States is sole superpower left in
world); Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine; In American Foreign Policy, a New Motto:
Don't Ask. Tell, TIME, Mar. 5, 2001, at 42 (stating that United States is no longer "inter-
national citizen," and has become most dominant power in world "since Rome"). Cf
Bolton, supra note 12, at 48 (describing hegemony of U.S. constitutional law); Choud-
hry, supra note 2, at 821 (noting extensive influence U.S. Constitution has had upon
writers of non-U.S. constitutions). But see L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 2, at 29-40
(claiming that under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence has become less influential overseas, and noting that internationally, concept of
"originalism" advocated by Justice Scalia is overwhelmingly disapproved of).
108. See Slaughter, Global Community, supra note 2, at 196 (noting that since 1945,
many non-U.S. courts, especially those formed by United States or upon U.S. model,
borrow heavily from U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence). Compare United States v.
Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (CalabresiJ., concurring) (claiming that United
States no longer has monopoly on constitutional review and stating that U.S. courts
should be willing to look to their "constitutional offspring" to see how they have dealt
with analogous problems), with Bolton, supra note 12, at 48 (stating that influence of
international law should be avoided at all costs in U.S. court decisions).
109. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. at 577-79 (holding juvenile death penalty to be
unconstitutional based in part on overwhelming worldwide consensus againt it); Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (holding laws prohibiting consensual adult
homosexual relations unconstitutional based in part on values of a "wider civilization");
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.20 (2002) (citing world community's over-
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ginia, a 2002 case prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded
offenders,1 ' and Lawrence v. Texas, a 2003 decision holding the
criminalization of homosexual sodomy unconstitutional." 1 Like
Roper, both of these decisions met with considerable criticism for
their invocation of international law.
1 12
1. Atkins v. Virginia
In Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated the constitu-
tionality of executing mentally retarded offenders. 1 3  In 1996,
Daryl Renard Atkins and an accomplice kidnapped, robbed, and
ultimately murdered a victim they had abducted from a local
convenience store.114 Atkins was convicted of capital murder,
and despite testimony by a forensic psychologist that he was
mentally retarded, was sentenced to death in Virginia state
whelming dissaproval of juvenile death penalty in opinion holding such punishment
unconstitutional).
110. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.20 (Stevens, J.) (stating that within world
community, executions of mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved
of), with id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting), (criticizing majority opinion for referencing
opinions of "so-called" world community, whose views and practices are "irrelevant,"
and whose conceptions ofjustice "are (thankfully) not always those of our people"). See
generally Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Death Penalty; Citing 'National Consen-
sus, 'Justices Bar Death Penalty for Retarded Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at Al
(providing brief overview of U.S. Supreme Court's recent death penalty jurisprudence).
111. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (citing advisory committee report to British
Parliament and European Court of Human Rights decision in Dudgeon v. United King-
dom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R_ (ser. A) (1981)); see also id. at 598 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (referring
to majority's references to international law as "[d]angerous dicta"); Joan L. Larsen,
Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization" Lawrence and the Rehnquist
Court's Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1284 (2004) (noting that Lawrence may have sparked judicial trend
towards citation of international opinions).
112. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Domestic, Not Foreign, NAT. REV. ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2005
(criticizing Lawrence for relying on European court decisions). But see Gerald L.
Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
82, 89 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence referred to international law only to rebut histori-
cal inaccuracies that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) relied upon to uphold laws
criminalizing homosexual relations).
113. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (framing question to be de-
cided as whether death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment for mentally
retarded offenders); see also Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at 81 (noting
that Atkins involved question of whether execution of mentally handicapped defendant
violated Eight Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
114. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 (recounting details of Atkins's crime); see also Kris-
ten F. Grunewald, Case Note, United States Supreme Court: Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct.
2242 (2002), 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117, 117 (2002) (explaining that Atkins and accomplices
were convicted of kidnapping and killing victim).
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court. 1
5
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Atkins argued that
the execution of mentally retarded offenders was cruel and unu-
sual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution." 6 The majority opinion looked to the prac-
tices of other U.S. states and found that the execution of men-
tally retarded offenders had become extremely rare." 7 On the
basis of this analysis the Court ruled that a national consensus
had developed against such executions, and held the practice to
be unconstitutional as a violation of the Eight Amendment's pro-
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment.1 8 In a footnote to
the majority opinion, however, the Court also noted that execut-
ing mentally retarded offenders was widely disapproved of in the
world community, citing a legal brief from the European Union
on the issue.1 1 ' Although the Court went on to state that world
opinion was not dispositive and served only to support their deci-
sion, the dissenting opinions were sharply critical of the major-
ity's invocation of non-U.S. sources.12 °
115. SeeAtkins, 536 U.S. at 308-09 (stating that Atkins was convicted of capital mur-
der and sentenced to death in Virginia state court; noting that defense introduced evi-
dence that Atkins was mentally retarded during penalty phase); see also Grunewald,
supra note 114, at 117 (recounting Atkins's conviction and testimony of forensic psy-
chologist, who declared him "mildly mentally retarded").
116. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310 (noting Atkins's contention that mentally chal-
lenged offenders cannot be executed under U.S. law); see also Grunewald, supra note
114, at 118 (explaining Atkins's argument that death penalty was cruel and unusual
punishment for mentally retarded offenders).
117. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (surveying previous U.S. Supreme Court juris-
prudence on changing meaning of "cruel and unusual punishment"); see also Grune-
wald, supra note 114, at 118-20 (discussing Atkins's examination of state practice in exe-
cuting mentally retarded offenders).
118. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (finding consensus against imposition of death
penalty for mentally retarded offenders); see also Grunewald, supra note 114, at 118-19
(noting U.S. Supreme Court's holding that execution of mentally retarded offenders is
unconstitutional, based on consensus of U.S. states against practice).
119. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing Brief for European Union as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-
8727), 2001 WArL 648609 (resubmitted in Atkins)); see also id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing majority opinion for imposing views of other Nations on U.S. citizens);
Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at 70 (observing that Atkins decision dis-
cussed views of "world community" on execution of mentally retarded criminals).
120. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (stating that although world opinion is not
dispositive, its consistency with legislative record supports finding that U.S. consensus
against executing mentally retarded offenders has developed). But see id. at 322-26
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for citing world opinion and
claiming that Court had previously explicitly rejected reliance on non-U.S. sources); see
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2. Lawrence v. Texas
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,
and struck down a Texas law that criminalized consensual homo-
sexual sodomy. 21  Lawrence explicitly overruled the Court's deci-
sion seventeen years earlier in Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld
a state law on the same issue. 1 22 The majority opinion in Law-
rence included a substantial discussion of Dudgeon v. United King-
dom,12 3 a European Court of Human Rights case that invalidated
an Irish law similar to the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence. In
addition, the Court considered the experience of British Parlia-
ment, which had received a report recommending that laws
criminalizing consensual homosexual relations be repealed. 24
Once again, the majority's reference to international law
prompted a strongly-worded dissent, which argued that an analy-
sis of U.S. constitutional rights should not include references to
the practices of non-U.S. Nations. 1 25 In addition to characteriz-
ing references to international law as "meaningless" and "dan-
gerous," the dissent stated that the Court should not impose
"foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.' 126 The dissent
also id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing world opinion as "irrelevant" to
interpretation of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
121. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers and hold-
ing that Due Process clause of U.S. Constitution confers a right to privacy in consensual
intercourse between consenting adults); see also Ramsey, International Materials, supra
note 15, at 70 (explaining holding of Lawrence overruled Bowers and struck down Texas
statute criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy).
122. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state statute criminal-
izing homosexual sodomy as constitutional), rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Cala-
bresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 877 (noting that Justice Kennedy, who authored
Lawrence, was overruling Bowers, which he had concurred in).
123. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (noting that European Court of Human Rights
"has followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom"); see also
Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 877 (recounting Lawrence decision's discussion of
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom).
124. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73 (referencing a 1957 British Parliament com-
mittee report recommending abolition of laws prohibiting homosexual relations); see
also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 878 (noting that Lawrence decision discussed
the experience of British Parliament).
125. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that constitu-
tional rights "do not spring into existence"just because foreign countries decriminalize
conduct); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 878 (characterizing Justice
Scalia's dissent in Lawrence as "biting"; noting dissent's criticism of majority opinion's
citation of non-U.S. law).
126. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to majority opin-
ion's reference to non-U.S. laws and practices); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note
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thus implied that Lawrence relied on international law to a
greater extent than the majority opinion made clear. 127
3. Roper v. Simmons
As the latest case to consider the role of international law in
U.S. courts, Roper explicitly illustrates the differing philosophies
of the U.S. Supreme CourtJustices on the subject.128 Roper's ma-
jority opinion squarely addressed the relevance of international
sources in U.S. legal decisions, as did its dissenting opinions.129
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy divided his opinion
into four parts: The first part discussed the facts of the case, the
second surveyed the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
to date, and the third discussed the Court's reasoning for hold-
ing the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional. 30 The fourth
- and most controversial - part of the majority's opinion ex-
13, at 878 (recounting Justice Scalia's objections to citation of international law in Law-
rence).
127. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that international
law citations should be considered "meaningless dicta"); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl,
supra note 13, at 878 (stating that Lawrence decision referenced and relied on interna-
tional law).
128. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of
Deference, 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 675, passim (2003) [hereinafter Alford, Federal Courts] (laying
out seven separate models for evaluating influence of international sources in federal
court decisions); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Juvenile Logic, NEw REP., Mar. 21, 2005, at 11
(criticizing Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper, and highlighting hostility social conserv-
atives evince towards uses of international law in judicial opinions); Ed Feulner, Court-
ing Trouble, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, atA18 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's Roperopin-
ion, and praising Justice Scalia's dissent); Editorial, Other Nations' Laws, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2005, at B2 (suggesting that one way to end consultation of international law in
U.S. Supreme Court decisions would be to amend U.S. Constitution, allowing Congress
to directly overrule Court decisions); Tony Mauro, A Lost Chance to Be the Chief LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at 1 (noting harsh criticism aimed atJustice Kennedy by prominent
Republican academics, politicians, and judicial officials as result of Roper opinion).
129. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-79 (referencing international laws as instructive in
determining whether execution of juvenile offenders constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment); see also Rosen, supra note 128 (criticizing Roper, claiming it to be sympto-
matic of international culture wars, with U.S. courts striking down traditional practices
in name of international moral values); Young, supra note 56, at 365 (characterizing
debate over international law in U.S. courts as "[o] ne of legal academia's more heated
spats in recent years"); Charles Lane, The Court Is Open for Discussion; AU Students Get
Rare Look At Justices' Legal Sparring, WASH. PosT, Jan. 14, 2005, at Al (describing public
debate at American University School of Law between Justices Scalia, Breyer, on topic
of international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation).
130. See Roper 543 U.S. at 556-60, 560-64, 564-75 & 575-79 (delineating four parts of
Justice Kennedy's opinion); see also Greenhouse, supra note 110 at Al (noting contro-
versy over international references in Roper).
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amined the views of non-U.S. courts and of the international
community on the juvenile death penalty.' 3' The Court noted
that the United States was the only Nation in the world that con-
tinued to sanction the execution of minors for their crimes, and
concluded that the overwhelming international condemnation
of the practice confirmed the Court's holding that the death
penalty was disproportionate punishment for offenders under
age eighteen.132
Though dissenting, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor specifi-
cally affirmed the relevance of international sources. 133 Both the
majority opinion and one of the dissents thus endorsed the prac-
tice of consulting international sources in U.S. decisions, but
only as confirmation of a conclusion already reached by the
Court's independent interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 134
Roper's dissent, however, disputed the majority's holding and ra-
tionale, and serves to illuminate the central controversy ad-
dressed by this Note. 135 In particular, the dissent complained
that the majority opinion was using international law as part of
the reasoned basis for its opinion, rather than as confirmation of
131. See Roper 543 U.S. at 575 (finding international consensus against juvenile
death penalty instructive in holding such punishment unconstitutional); see also Green-
house, supra. note 110 (noting that fourth part of Kennedy's Roper opinion was most
controversial).
132. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-76 (noting international consensus againstjuvenile
death penalty); see also Joan Biskupic, Teen Killers Can't Be Executed, USA TODAY, Mar. 2,
2005, at IA (noting that until Roper was decided, United States stood virtually alone as
only country to officially sanction death penalty for juvenile offenders).
133. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Jus-
tice Scalia's assertion that international materials have no place in U.S. Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); see also Saletan, supra note 135 (noting dis-
agreement between Justices Scalia and O'Connor on relevance of international
sources).
134. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (stating that "[o]ur determination that the death
penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 605
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "the existence of an international consensus...
can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consen-
sus.") (emphasis added); John 0. McGinness, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L.
RaV. 303, 306 & n.16 (2006) (noting that U.S. Supreme Court cited to international law
as "confirmation" of its opinion thatjuvenile death penalty is unconstitutional in Roper).
135. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that majority hold-
ing's reliance on international law should be rejected, and that majority does not even
subscribe to rationale announced in its own opinion); see also William Saletan, Rough
Justice, SLATE, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2114219/ (characterizing Justice
Scalia's dissent as derisive and accusatory).
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a genuine consensus found within the United States. 1 6
II. THEORIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. COURTS
Some scholars and jurists view the influence of international
law on U.S. jurisprudence as a comparative tool to be embraced;
others view such an influence as an unsanctioned violation of
constitutional authority. 137 Support for each side can be found
in the recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions discussed above, 3 '
as the growing number of references to international law have
prompted responses of approval, outrage, or interest from each
of the nine Justices on the Court at the time Roper was de-
cided. 13  One group of Justices finds international law relevant
in deciding controversial areas of constitutional adjudication,
while the rest consider it irrelevant.14 ° This description, how-
136. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that majority opinion
gives too much power to opinions of non-U.S. countries); see also Calabresi & Zimdahl,
supra note 13, at 865-66 (recounting Justice Scalia's argument that majority opinion in
Roper was relying on international law as actual basis for decision).
137. Compare Koh, International Law as Our Law, supra note 2, at 57-58 (arguing that
U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally used international law in constitutional delibera-
tions and should continue to do so), with Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some
Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 650
(1999) (arguing that use of international law to inform U.S. constitutional deliberations
is incompatible with U.S. system of government).
138. See United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., con-
curring) (noting benefits of looking to international sources when considering solu-
tions to common constitutional problems). Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., dissenting) (arguing
that views of other Nations are irrelevant for purposes of U.S. constitutional interpreta-
tion), with Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 330 (stating that views of non-U.S. Nations are
relevant for purposes of U.S. constitutional interpretation).
139. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J.) (defending practice of looking to
international sources when considering with close constitutional questions); see also Ste-
phen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 Am. J. INr' L. PROC. ANN. 265 (2003) (proclaiming
international sources to be relevant to constitutional deliberation); Roger P. Alford, In
Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REv. 639, 639 & n. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Alford, Comparativism] (listing instances in which U.S. Supreme CourtJus-
tices have referenced issue of international law's influence).
140. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J., joined by
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.) (stating that worldwide disap-
proval of executing juvenile offenders lends support to majority decision holding juve-
nile death penalty unconstitutional). But see id. at 322, 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined
by Scalia and Thomas, 1J., dissenting) (characterizing majority opinion's consultation of
international materials as defective, unprecedented, irrelevant to decisional process).
See generally David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REv. 652, 652-62 (2005)
(highlighting disagreements over relevance of international sources in recent decisions
on controversial issues which deal with unenumerated rights such as abortion, gay
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ever, fails to capture the underlying argument justifying these
philosophies; Yale Law School Dean Harold H. Koh has offered
a more descriptive classification, identifying these competing
theories as indicative of "nationalist" or "transnationalist" juris-
prudence. 1 4 1
A. Nationalist Jurisprudence
Nationalist jurisprudence is marked by an insistence upon
the absolute supremacy of the U.S. Constitution's text and a re-
jection of international sources in considering U.S. constitu-
tional questions. 142 Of the three RoperJustices who adhere to
the nationalistic jurisprudence, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
opposed any judicial references to international law in their in-
terpretations of the U.S. Constitution.' 4 3 The late Chief Justice
Rehnquist was often aligned with Justices Scalia and Thomas in
criticizing the use of international law, however, some of his
rights, death penalty); Alford, Comparativism, supra note 139, at 640 (noting that U.S.
Supreme Court is bitterly divided over citing to international law).
141. SeeKoh, InternationalLaw as OurLaw, supra note 2, at 52-53 (setting out tenets
of "nationalist" and "transnationalist"jurisprudence); see alsoJohn Dugard, The Implica-
tions for the Legal Profession of Conflicts Between International Law and National Law, 46 S.
TEX. L. REV. 579, 590 (2005) (noting with approval Professor Koh's distinction of two
main types of global jurisprudence).
142. See Alford, Comparativism, supra note 139, at 655 (noting thatJustice Scalia, as
proponent of originalist theory of constitutional interpretation, has consistently op-
posed references to contemporary international sources as irrelevant); see also Scalia &
Breyer, supra note 15, at 526 (quoting Justice Scalia as saying that non-U.S. standards of
decency are irrelevant because non-U.S. countries do not share U.S. background, cul-
ture, or moral values); see generally Koh, International Law as Our Law, supra note 2, at 52
(marking general contours of nationalist jurisprudence theory).
143. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(opposing consultation of international sources in determining constitutionality of laws
regulating consensual adult sexual relations); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340-41,
347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (objecting to majority opinion's reference to inter-
national sources); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (mem.) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in denial of certiorari) (stating that U.S. Supreme Court should not consult
fads or opinions of other Nations); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 n.1 (1999)
(Thomas,J, concurring in denial of certiorari) (claiming that if petitioners' request for
rehearing had any merit, it would not require resort to opinions of other Nations, and
would instead rely on U.S. court decisions); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921
n.l1 (1997) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (holding comparative constitutional analysis
irrelevant in deciding constitutional questions). See generally Alford, Comparativism, supra
note 139, at 640 & n.1 (discussing opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas critical of
consultation of international sources); Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at
69 (notingJustice Scalia's distaste for use of international materials in expanding scope
of U.S. constitutional rights).
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opinions and writings indicate a more lenient viewpoint regard-
ing the uses of international law. 4 4 Although they exhibit differ-
ences, there are several propositions common to theories of na-
tionalist jurisprudence.1 4 5
1. American Exceptionalism
The term "American Exceptionalism" is said to have been
popularized by Alexis de Tocqueville, and has historically been
used to express the idea that the United States differs signifi-
cantly from other Nations as a result of its unique origins, evolu-
tion, and distinctive political and religious organization.146
American Exceptionalism has many forms, but in the context of
evaluating the relevance of international law to U.S. constitu-
tional analysis, it has two distinct prongs: The first prong stresses
that the United States is a unique political organization whose
laws and Constitution are incompatible with those of other Na-
tions.'4 7 The second prong highlights potential problem areas
144. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16 (1997) (Rehn-
quist, C.J.) (noting worldwide condemnation of euthanasia as criminal act); Raines v.
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting favorably European laws re-
garding legislative standing, but declining to apply such law because it is not provided
for in U.S. Constitution); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing to abortion cases
from Supreme Court of Canada and West German Constitutional Court); William H.
Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts - Comparative Remarks, reprinted in GERMANY AND ITS BA-
SIC LAw: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE - A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411-12 (Paul
Kirchoff & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (stating that because constitutional law is
now solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time for U.S. courts to begin looking to
their decisions for aid in deciding U.S. cases). But see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
347-48 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's reliance on interna-
tional laws); see also Larsen, supra note 111, at 1288-89 (claiming that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's discussion of European law in Raines v. Byrd was only intended to show by
contrast what U.S. law did not stand for).
145. See Koh, International Law as Our Law, supra note 2, at 52-57 (outlining various
theories of U.S. constitutional law's interaction with international law); see also Kreimer,
supra note 137, at 642-44 (criticizing "constitutional borrowing" as incompatible with
U.S. values and traditions).
146. See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 36-37 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Henry Reeve trans., A.A. Knopf 1948) (1835); see also Harold Hongju Koh, On Amer-
ican Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. Rv. 1479, 1481 n.4 (2003) [hereinafter Koh, American
Exceptionalism] (noting history of term "American Exceptionalism").
147. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing plurality opinion's consideration of international norms in constitu-
tional interpretation as inappropriate because "the views of other nations, however en-
lightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be," cannot be forced on U.S.
citizens through the U.S. Constitution); see also Choudhry, supra note 2, at 830 (describ-
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where international legal principles might cut against accepted
notions of core U.S. constitutional rights.1 48
a. The Unique Position of the United States
Insistence that U.S. constitutional values and issues are
unique and different from constitutional issues considered
abroad is perhaps the most defining tenet of nationalist jurispru-
dence. 14 9 Under this theory, the content of non-U.S. laws and
decisions of non-U.S. courts are irrelevant.150  Because the
United States is a unique Nation, the argument goes, non-U.S.
legal opinions or laws are unhelpful in deciding U.S. constitu-
tional issues. 51 Nationalist jurisprudence argues that these irrel-
evant international sources cannot be used when considering
U.S. constitutional issues, because analysis must rest upon the
ing "legal particularism" theory, which finds international sources irrelevant for U.S.
constitutional interpretation); Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15, at 521 (stating opinion of
Justice Scalia that international law should not be consulted when interpreting U.S.
Constitution because United States has unique moral and legal framework).
148. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that if U.S. Supreme Court were to survey international laws on abortion, they would
find few Nations permitting practice); see also Ramsey, International Materials, supra note
15, at 81 (noting that in many areas, U.S. law is more rights-protective than interna-
tional norms).
149. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15, at 521 (stating opinion ofJustice Scalia that
United States has always had unique moral, legal framework that is significantly differ-
ent from rest of world); see also Koh, American Exceptionalism, supra note 146, at 1483
(describing U.S. insistence on using different labels to describe internationally recog-
nized concepts of rights); Spiro, supra note 55, at 12 (explaining that "linchpin" of anti-
international law arguments is reliance on ability of United States to opt out of interna-
tional law); Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALEJ. INT'L
L. 409, 421 (2003) (stating that U.S. insistence on referencing "civil" or "constitutional"
rights instead of "human" rights necessarily implicates opinion that U.S. experience is
different from rest of world).
150. See Koh, American Exceptionalism, supra note 146, at 1482 (discussing various
typologies of American Exceptionalism); see also Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 331 (linking
critics of international law with "originalist" constitutional theorists, and remarking that
although "partisans of that view sometimes carry the day," U.S. Supreme Court's trend
is toward more inclusive view of international law); Law, supra note 140, at 729 (noting
opponents of international consultation often promote originalist theory of constitu-
tional interpretation); Mark Tushnet, Returning With Interest: Observations on Some Puta-
tive Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 334
(1998) (noting similarities between "strong organicist" position in use of constitutional
borrowing with nationalist jurisprudence theory).
151. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15 (stating Justice Scalia's view that laws of
other countries are irrelevant for purposes of deciding constitutional issues); see also
Spiro, supra note 55, (noting recent academic support for position against relevance of
international law).
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decisions of U.S. courts and legislators.15 2
A clear example of the American Exceptionalism paradigm
is found in Printz v. United States.'55 At issue in Printz was federal
legislation requiring state and local law enforcement officials to
assist the federal government in performing background checks
on handgun purchasers. 154 The majority opinion held that the
legislation violated principles of federalism and was therefore
unconstitutional.' 55 The dissent, however, suggested that feder-
alism concerns did not require the Court to strike down the leg-
islation at issue, and cited the success of the centralized author-
ity system utilized by the European Union ("EU") to control na-
tional governments within Europe as an example.156
The majority opinion responded by stating that considera-
tion of the benefits of the EU system, or of any non-U.S. system,
is irrelevant, since they are not the same as the U.S. system. 157
The recently overruled Stanford case - which upheld the consti-
152. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626-27 & n.9 (2005) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (stating that international sources are irrelevant in interpreting unique tenets
of American Jurisprudence); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Conver-
gence, Resitance, Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REv. 109, 114 (2005) (stating that Justice
Scalia's opinions sometimes evince "a kind of willful indifference to foreign law in con-
stitutional interpretation"); Harding, supra note 149, at 421 (claiming that nationalist
jurisprudince evinces isolationist tendencies).
153. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.l1 (1997) (criticizing Justice Breyer's
dissent for considering benefits of non-U.S. systems of federalism and labeling "compar-
ative analysis" inappropriate for interpreting U.S. Constitution); see also Vicki C. Jack-
son, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation
on "Proportionality, "Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 583, 593 (1999) (claiming
that Justice Scalia's opinion in Printz was influenced by American Exceptionalism para-
digm).
154. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (Scalia, J.) (holding legislation requiring State offi-
cials to assist federal government in performing background checks on handgun pur-
chasers to be unconstitutional); see also Harding, supra note 149, at 43940 (noting Jus-
tice Scalia's position in Printz on irrelevance of any non-U.S. laws for U.S. constitutional
interpretation).
155. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (holding Brady Act unconstitutional); see also Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARv. L.
REV. 2180, 2183 (1998) (noting Supreme Court's ruling in Printz held Brady Act to be
unconstitutional violation of principles of federalism).
156. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that experiences
of non-U.S. federal systems demonstrate that alternative forms of dual sovereignty are
workable); see also Tushnet, supra note 150, at 326 (summarizing Justice Breyer's dis-
sent).
157. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.l (Scalia, J.) (stating that comparative constitu-
tional analysis is inappropriate when interpreting, U.S. Constitution); see also Scalia &
Breyer, supra note 15, at 521 (repeating Justice Scalia's statement that Russia employs a
rule similar to U.S. Miranda requirement, but does not employ corresponding U.S. the-
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tutionality of the juvenile death penalty - employed similar lan-
guage.15 8 The overwhelming number of countries that prohib-
ited the juvenile death penalty, which the dissent had considered
as a factor in its deliberative process, was considered irrelevant
by the majority.' 59
b. U.S. Law as Rights Enhancing
Another persistent criticism of the use of international law
in U.S. constitutional interpretation concerns areas in which
U.S. jurisprudence is considered to be far more "rights enhanc-
ing" than the prevailing attitudes of the world.'6 ° Proponents of
American Exceptionalism argue that although there are certain
issues - such as the juvenile death penalty - where the United
States takes the minority position by denying a globally-accepted
right, there are other constitutional issues - such as abortion,
criminal procedure rights, free speech, or separation of church
and State - where the United States is in the minority as one of
the most rights-protective Nations in the world.' 6 ' Nationalist ju-
ory of evidentiary exclusion, as illustration of dangers of comparative constitutional
analysis).
158. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.2 (1989) (emphasizing that U.S.
notions of decency are dispositive in Eighth Amendment cases, making practices of
other countries irrelevant), rev'd, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). But see Scalia & Breyer, supra
note 15, at 534 (stating opinion ofJustice Scalia that reading non-U.S. judicial opinions
is constitutionally permissible, but to use their legal reasoning in deciding U.S. cases is
not).
159. Compare Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 (emphasizing that "it is American concep-
tions of decency that are dispositive," and rejecting contention that sentencing prac-
tices of other Nations are relevant), with id. at 389-90, (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that non-U.S. legislation is an objective indicator "of contemporary standards of de-
cency," and is therefore relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis of what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment); see also Koh, American Exceptionalism, supra note 146, at
1482 (classifying Stanford as example of American Exceptionalism paradigm); Harding,
supra note 149 at 420 (noting Justice Scalia's rejection of international sources in Stan-
ford).
160. See Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at 69-70 (stating that for con-
stitutional theory incorporating international sources, there must be neutral theory of
relevance); see also Larsen, supra note 111, at 1319-21 (noting that United States is far
more protective of free speech rights than rest of world).
161. See Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at 81 (commenting that rig-
orous comparison of international sources with U.S. conceptions of rights is likely to
find United States more protective of greater number of rights than other Nations); see
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if
U.S. Supreme Court were to consider international sources when considering establish-
ment clause cases, they would find United States almost alone in its rigid separation
between church and State); Larsen, supra note 111, at 1288-89 (noting that internation-
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risprudence argues that if international sources are to play a part
in U.S. court decisions, they must play a consistent role; other-
wise they are simply being used as a guise for the personal opin-
ions of the judges who invoke them. 16 2 Professor Michael D.
Ramsey has termed this problem "taking the bitter with the
sweet," and implies that a rigorous use of international sources
may not be palatable to proponents of transnational jurispru-
dence, since it would require U.S. practice to fall in line with the
more rights-restrictive international practices.
163
2. Democratic Concerns With the Use of International Law
The preceding arguments focus upon the exceptional na-
ture of the U.S. system, arguing that the consultation of interna-
tional law is ineffective and irrelevant for U.S. courts interpret-
ing the U.S. Constitution. This Section focuses on another vein
of criticism, which seeks to show why consulting international
law is undemocratic and unconstitutional. This criticism is ex-
pressed both by political elites and by many average U.S. citizens.
a. Political Criticism
Critics in the academic world and in the U.S. judiciary have
expressed concern that the consultation of international law en-
dangers the theory of representative democracy in the United
States by corrupting the nature of the judicial process.1 6 4 The
argument against such consultation is similar to a traditional crit-
ally, United States is among most protective of abortion rights, and pointing out that
most other Nations allow far more restrictions on free speech).
162. See Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at 76-77 (stating that rigor-
ous system of use for international sources requires that they not be used to create
selective outcomes); see also Law, supra note 140 passim (attempting to define "neutral"
constitutional theory which would incorporate international law and yield non-selective
decisions).
163. See Ramsey, International Materials, supra note 15, at 76-77 (claiming that any
theory incorporating international materials must, to be fair, consult international
norms that are more rights-restrictive than U.S. laws, in addition to those that are more
rights-expanding). Cf Roper, 543 U.S. at 624-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Su-
preme Court's interpretation of laws pertaining to abortion, exclusion of evidence, and
separation of church and State are each out of line with international practice).
164. See Thompson v. Okla., 487 U.S. 815, 869 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that U.S. Constitution forbids allowing views of other Nations to be imposed upon
U.S. citizens, and that fact that majority of Nations prohibits juvenile death penalty is
not relevant to deliberations of U.S. Supreme Court); see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 16 at 873 (asserting that practice of federal courts interpreting and applying
international law is in tension with basic U.S. constitutional principles).
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icism of 'judicial activism": it accords policy making power to
the opinions and practices of unelected, unaccountable sources
- in this case, the governments, judiciaries, and opinions of
other Nations. 16 5 Accusations of judicial activism often stem
from the fact that U.S. federal judges enjoy lifetime tenure, and
are appointed, rather than democratically elected."66 This raises
concerns that federal judges are unaccountable, and thus likely
to rely on their own opinions, rather than the relevant law.167
Nationalist jurisprudence, however, has redirected criticism
aimed at the personal opinions of unaccountable, unelected
judges to the opinions of unaccountable non-U.S. Nations.168
Under this paradigm, judicial consultation of international
sources is an unsanctioned delegation of authority, and should
be prohibited as unconstitutional.' 6 9
The distrust of international sources extends far beyond
academia and the judiciary; in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, several members of Congress have introduced a "Reaffir-
mation of American Independence Resolution."17 ° The Resolu-
165. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism, "92
CALIF. L. REv. 1441 passim (2004) (summarizing history and current meaning of term
"judicial activism"); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in
Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2002) (describing term "judicial ac-
tivism" as empty of meaning).
166. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that federal judges are appointed to serve
"during good behavior"); see also Robert L. Brown, From Earl Warren to Wendell Griffen: A
Study ofJudicial Intimidation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1, 7
(2005) (noting that U.S. federal judges are appointed for life and are not subject to
reelection or other democratic concerns).
167. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 434 (A. Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(positing that lifetime appointments for federal judges would increase their indepen-
dences and impartiality), see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISENGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 3-4 (2001) (arguing against conception of federal judges as unaccounta-
ble and undemocratic).
168. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Whose Constitution is it Anyway?, NAT'L REv., Dec. 8,
2003, at 37 (claiming that U.S. Supreme Court, in consulting international sources, is
remaking U.S. Constitution to be more like constitutions of Africa, Europe, and Asia);
see also Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 57, 58-61 (2004) (worrying that allowing international sources to influence U.S.
constitutional interpretation will give rise to "international countermajoritarian diffi-
culty," allowing U.S. Supreme Court to thwart will of majority of U.S. citizens).
169. See Bahdi, supra note 2, at 593 (noting that judges are aware that many in
academic and legal fields consider consultation of international sources to be unquali-
fied judicial activism); see also Glennon, supra note 68, at 351 (observing that citations to
anything other than U.S. legal authorities often incurs charges of judicial activism).
170. See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (House Resolution expressing idea that
U.S. courts should not refer to non-U.S. laws in deciding U.S. cases); see also Calabresi &
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tion expresses disapproval of the judicial consultation of non-
U.S. law in deciding U.S. cases - explicitly mentioning Lawrence
as an example - and argues that decisions invoking interna-
tional laws threaten the sovereignty of the United States. 7 ' On
the website of U.S. Representative Tom Feeney (R-Fla.), the bill's
co-sponsor, the headline introducing the legislation poses the
question "Should Americans Be Governed By the Laws of Ja-
maica, India, Zimbabwe, or the European Union?" 17 2 Represen-
tative Feeney and other members of Congress are not alone in
their disapproval.' 73 This distrust of international law is shared
by many across the country, who label judges consulting interna-
tional sources 'Judicial activists."' 7 4
Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 752-53 (noting recent introduction of Reaffirmation of
American Independence Resolution).
171. See H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (criticizing U.S. Supreme Court for
relying on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of non-U.S. institutions in Lawrence); see
also Henkin, The Ghost of Senator Bricker, supra note 13, at 346 (recounting failed efforts
in mid 1950s by Senator Bricker (R-Ohio) to amend U.S. Constitution to include provi-
sion prohibiting any international treaties from binding United States unless support-
ing legislation were enacted); Bradley, supra note 79, at 523 (noting one reason Bricker
Amendment failed was because Eisenhower administration promised U.S. Senators it
would not seek ratification of any major human rights treaties, including International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")); James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms
Declined: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
105, 113-14 (2000) (characterizing Bricker Amendment as evincing U.S. attitude to-
wards human rights, resisting examination or criticism from non-U.S. actors).
172. Official Website of Congressman Tom Feeney, at http://www.house.gov/fee-
ney/reaffirmation.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (utilizing language similar to Justice
Clarence Thomas' concurrence in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999)); see also
Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (stating that "I
am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's
precedent for .... proponents of the claim to rely on the European Court of Human
Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy
Council [of Jamaica]").
173. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003) (singling outJustices Stevens, Ken-
nedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer by name for criticism over their repeated uses of interna-
tional sources); see also Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2323, 108th Cong. § 201
(2004) (attempting to prohibit federal courts from considering international or non-
U.S. law - except for English law - in interpreting or applying U.S. Constitution);
Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003) (expressing
sense of the U.S. House of Representatives "that the Supreme Court should base its
decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the United States, and not on the law of
any foreign country or any international law or agreement not made under the author-
ity of the United States").
174. See Phyllis Schlafly, Global Benchmarks, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at A13 (la-
menting, from perspective of prominent conservative commentator, U.S. Supreme
Court's "effort to import international law into the United States," and implying that
judges consulting international laws should be impeached); see also Romney, Bush Con-
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b. Popular Disapproval
Much evidence exists to suggest that the concept of
unelected "activist judges" imposing their preference for non-
U.S. law in U.S. courts is a widely held concern in the United
States, as illustrated by the outcome of the November 2004 U.S.
presidential elections.1 5 Beginning after Lawrence, and escalat-
ing after Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,1 76 the controver-
sial case legalizing same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, conserva-
tive political groups were vocally critical of what many labeled
"activist judges," guilty of imposing their personal beliefs on the
U.S. population.1 7 7 A year after Goodridge was decided, eleven
states passed amendments to their constitutions, effectively bar-
ring same-sex couples from marrying. 178 These amendments are
tend Some Judges Go Too Far, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2004, at B6 (listing quotes from
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney and U.S. President George W. Bush accusing
judges in Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003) ofjudicial activism for
legalizing same-sex marriages in Massachusetts).
175. See Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Marriage: Did Issue Help Re-Elect Bush, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov 4, 2004, at Al (noting that issue galvanized millions of U.S. voters opposed to same-
sex marriage); see also Joan Vennochi, Was Gay Marriage Kerry's Undoing?, BOST. GLOBE,
Nov. 4, 2004, at A15 (noting that Republican strategists viewed same-sex marriage as
wedge issue during presidential election of 2004; quoting President George W. Bush as
saying that Goodridge court "overreached its bounds as a court" by extending marriage
rights to same-sex couples); Elizabeth Mehren, Bush Baffles Massachusetts Liberals, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004 at A17 (theorizing that President Bush's repeated references to
SenatorJohn Kerry as "Massachusetts Liberal" was veiled attempt to associate Kerry with
Goodridge decision legalizing same-sex marriage).
176. See Goodridge, 440 Mass. 309 (2003) (holding Massachusetts state Constitution
to preclude limiting marriages to be between men and women); see also Excerpts From the
Massachusetts Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at 24 (excerpting passages from Good-
ridge case, noting that case held prohibition on same-sex marriages to be unconstitu-
tional).
177. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 346-47 (2003) (hold-
ing Massachusetts Constitution permitted same-sex marriage); see also Vennochi, supra
note 175, at A15 (describing backlash to Goodridge decision). Although Goodridge did
not rely upon international sources, it is often understood as a logical outgrowth of
Lawrence, as it echoes many substantive due process rights articulated in Lawrence, was
decided very soon after Lawrence, and was seized upon by many opponents of Lawrence
as extension of "judicial activism." See Scott Dodson, Commentary, Reconsider an Old
Taboo: Judicial Activism, NJ. L. J., Nov. 8, 2004 (noting use of Goodridge as exemplar of
"judicial activism," and arguing this premise); see also Kevin Martin, Op-Ed, Disorder in
the Democracy, BOST. HERALD, Feb. 6, 2004, at 25 (stating that decision in Goodridge cast
national spotlight on issue ofjudicial activism).
178. See Sarah Kershaw, Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain Widespread
Support in 10 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P9 (noting passage of State amendments
banning gay-marriage in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah, and impending passage of similar amend-
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believed to have been motivated in part by a public backlash to
the Goodridge ruling, as well as to San Francisco Mayor Gavin
Newsom's decision to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples early in 2003.179
B. Transnationalist Jurisprudence
In contrast with nationalist jurisprudence, transnationalist
jurisprudence considers international sources to have an intrin-
sic value when deciding certain types of U.S. constitutional is-
sues, and is demonstrated in recent pronouncements by a num-
ber of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.' Transnational jurispru-
dence encompasses a wide spectrum of viewpoints, making a
unified theory difficult to assemble; though there are some uni-
fying themes, they tend to diverge along lines of weak and strong
transnationalism. 1'8 Weak transnationalist jurisprudence is ex-
emplified by the opinions of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
ment in Oregon); see also Brad Knickerbocker, Political battles over gay marriage still spread-
ing, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 29, 2004, at 1 (noting that gay marriage contin-
ues to be considered hot-button issue even after 11 state amendments passed in Novem-
ber 2004).
179. See Fred Bayles & Andrea Stone, Gay-marriage Foes Try to Stop 'Activist Courts,'
USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at 6A (noting anger directed at courts over Lawrence and
Goodridge decisions); see also David von Drehle, Take the Issues to the People, Not to the
Courts, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at B4 (describing specter of 'judicial activism" as
powerful galvanizing political issue); Dean E. Murphy, Democrats Blame Some of Their
Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at Al (analyzing political backlash against gay marriage,
and highlighting criticism of San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's decision to allow
gay marriages by Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) as moti-
vating Republicans to vote).
180. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(stating that experiences of other Nations may be helpful in solving U.S. issues of com-
mon legal nature); see also Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 Am. Soc. INT'L L. &
PROC. 265, 267 (2003) (stating that lines between comparative law and international law
have become blurred as constitutional courts of different countries render decisions on
increasingly similar issues); Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) (noting Justice Ginsburg's question during oral argu-
ments on whether Supreme Court should decline to consider rationales employed by
Canada, European Union, or South Africa in upholding affirmative action); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 342, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing international
conceptions of affirmative action); Ginsburg, supra note 3, at 329-30 (stating that com-
parative analysis of opinions and practices of other Nations is nothing new in U.S. con-
stitutional interpretation).
181. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1287-97 (setting out examples of different ways
in which Rehnquist Court has utilized international sources in constitutional decision-
making); see also Koh, American Exceptionalism, supra note 146, at 52 (contrasting theory
of transnationalist jurisprudence with theory of nationalist jurisprudence).
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that have occasionally discussed the legal practices of other Na-
tions, and by Justice Kennedy's "confirmatory" use of interna-
tional sources in Roper.182 Strong transnationalist jurisprudence
is exemplified in the extrajudicial writings of Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and O'Connor. 183
1. Weak Transnationalism: Expository and Empirical Value
Weak transnationalism views international law as an instruc-
tive tool for determining the proper scope of U.S. constitutional
law."8 4 Professor Joan Larsen describes these uses of interna-
tional sources as "expository" and "empirical" uses of compara-
tive constitutional materials. 185 Although both methods look to
the experiences of other Nations, neither uses international law
as the reasoned legal basis for a constitutional decision.186
a. Expository Value
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Raines v. Byrd illus-
trates the "expository" use of international material, citing vari-
182. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (discussing
European laws regarding legislative standing); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
734 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting Dutch experience with legalization of assisted sui-
cide).
183. See, e.g., Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15, at 527-28 (recounting opinion of Jus-
tice Breyer that international law may be consulted in defining what constitutes "cruel
and unusual punishment" under U.S. Constitution); see also Ginsburg, supra note 3, at
336-37 (stating that U.S. Supreme Court should continue to allow international law to
inform U.S. constitutional analysis); Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address: Dedication
of Eric E. Hotung International Law Center Building at Georgetown University (Oct. 27, 2004),
36 GEo. J. INT'L L. 651, 651-53 (2005) (explaining that international law is increasingly
used in U.S. courts).
184. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1288-89 (suggesting that use of international
sources to contrast and thereby explain U.S. constitutional rules is "expository" use of
international sources); see, e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (1997) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (con-
trasting European laws regarding legislative standing to sue with U.S. constitutional lim-
itations on same issue); Printz, 521 U.S. at 977 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (stating that Euro-
pean Union's experiences with alternative models of federalism might inform U.S.
practice).
185. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1288-89 (cataloguing examples of "expository"
and "empirical" uses of comparative constitutional law); see also Bodansky, supra note
14, at 425 (noting that foreign sources may prove instructive in determining how pro-
spective legal rules operate in practice).
186. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1286-87 (stating that expository and empirical
uses of international law are not as problematic as theories which rely on international
law to supply meaning to U.S. Constitution); see also Bodansky, supra note 14, at 423
(explaining that international law has not explicitly influenced recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, but has indirectly been referenced).
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ous methods for determining legislative standing used by a num-
ber of European constitutional courts.187 The opinion cited the
legislative standing requirements as a contrast to the U.S. system,
but declined to use them as support for the ultimate holding,
stating that the U.S Constitution set out a different system.18 8 An
expository use of international sources thus does not reach the
issue of the influence of international sources, since they are
only consulted to define the contours of the comparative U.S.
constitutional practice.189 A weak transnationalist theory consid-
ers non-U.S. laws as comparative tools, useful foils for explaining
or contrasting current U.S. practices.'9
b. Empirical Value
Another use for international sources is to demonstrate the
usefulness of a particular constitutional interpretation. 19 ' Em-
pirical use evaluates the outcome of a non-U.S. constitutional in-
terpretation to gauge the practical effect it might have if applied
in the United States. 112 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Washington v. Glucksberg, which considered the constitutional-
ity of the State of Washington's ban on physician-assisted suicide,
187. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (arguing that there is nothing irrational about vari-
ous European systems for granting legislative standing to sue); see also Larsen, supra
note 111, at 1288-89 (stating that Raines exemplifies "expository" use of comparative
constitutional materials).
188. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (noting methods for determining legislative stand-
ing in European Constitutional Courts, but declining to adopt them because they do
not comport with system set out by U.S. Constitution); see also Larsen, supra note 111, at
1288-89 (reviewing use of international materials in Raines).
189. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1288-89 (noting that expository use of compara-
tive materials is only to contrast and thereby explain U.S. law); see also Jackson, supra
note 153, at 605-11 (noting Canadian Supreme Court decisions that might prove useful
to U.S. Supreme Court for purposes of contrasting contents of U.S. law).
190. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1288-89 (describing expository use of compara-
tive materials as useful for illuminating differences between legal systems); see alsoJack-
son, supra note 153, at 605-11 (using expository model of transnationalistjurisprudence
to analyze Canadian Supreme Court decisions).
191. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1289-91 (classifying this use of international
sources as "empirical"); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997)
(noting disturbingly large number of physician assisted suicides that lacked explicit
consent of deceased in Netherlands, which was only country to legalize procedure).
192. See Larsen, supra note 111, at 1299 (contending that empirical use of interna-
tional sources is justified when U.S. Supreme Court seeks to discern impact certain
constitutional interpretations might have); see alsoJackson, supra note 153, at 610-11
(suggesting that constitutional comparativism might assist U.S. Supreme Court in ascer-
taining probable outcomes of their decisions).
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exemplifies the empirical use of international sources."' 3 Al-
though the majority opinion began by stating that its analysis
would begin with an examination of U.S. history, legal traditions,
and practice, it went on to extensively consider the laws of the
Netherlands. 94 Because the Netherlands was the only country
in the world at the time that had legalized assisted suicide, the
Court gave special weight to studies that detailed the myriad
problems and potential for abuse brought on by the legalization
of assisted suicide. 1
95
2. Strong Transnationalism
Strong transnationalism utilizes both the expository and em-
pirical benefits of comparative constitutional study, but goes fur-
ther, considering international law as a possible basis for deci-
sions in U.S. constitutional decision-making. 96 Strong transna-
tionalist jurisprudence considers non-U.S. sources as beneficial
for contemplating U.S. constitutional questions.19 7 The benefits
include a salutary effect on U.S. foreign relations, the continuing
influence of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence around the
world, and comity in non-U.S. courts for U.S. judicial deci-
193. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735 (holding Washington State ban on physician-
assisted suicide constitutional); see also id. at 785 (Breyer, J., concurring) (giving special
weight to Dutch experience with physician-assisted suicide, as Netherlands was only
country with experience that "has yielded empirical evidence about how such regula-
tions might affect actual practice"); Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 873 (stating
that Glucksberg majority and concurring opinions "are inundated" with references to
laws and practices of non-U.S. States).
194. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (surveying the experience of the Netherlands
and concluding that legalized euthanasia did not reduce problems associated with as-
sisted suicide); Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 873 (noting Glucksberg's discus-
sion of Dutch experience with legalized euthanasia).
195. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (surveying the experience of the Netherlands
and concluding that legalized euthanasia did not reduce problems associated with as-
sisted suicide); Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 13, at 873 (noting Glucksbergs discus-
sion of Dutch experience with legalized euthanasia).
196. See Law, supra note 140, at 662 (observing that many Nations face conflicts
between unelected judiciary and democratically elected governments); see also
L'Heureux-Dube, supra note 2, at 37-40 (noting that U.S. Supreme Court's failure to
participate in "international dialogue" has eroded their influence in non-U.S. courts).
197. See Koh, International Law as Our Law, supra note 2, at 52-53 (noting that pro-
ponents of transnationalist jurisprudence look favorably on the influence of non-U.S.
and international law); see also see also Larsen, supra note 111, at 1297 (criticizing recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions for considering international law in their constitutional
analysis).
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sions."9 s Many arguments advocating for the consideration of in-
ternational sources also cite the U.S. Declaration of Indepen-
dence, which delineates the United States as a Nation that, from
its inception, has given a "decent respect to the opinions of man-
kind."'99
Justice Breyer has clearly articulated the "reason-borrowing"
rationale for consultation of international materials. 20 0 An anal-
ogous process is that in which consensus is determined on close
constitutional issues by the U.S. Supreme Court; U.S. state court
decisions and legislation are weighed by the Court to determine
what the majority viewpoint is and for persuasive value. 20 1 Roper
provides an excellent example: Justice Kennedy adopted the
reasoning of the state court below because he found it to be a
convincing argument.2°2  The question that proponents of
strong transnational theory offer is: if the U.S. Supreme Court
listens to the rationale of a U.S. state court that goes against es-
tablished U.S. Supreme Court precedent, why would it choose to
198. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15, at 523 (stating Justice Breyer's opinion that
one reason U.S. Supreme Court might cite to decisions of nascent foreign constitu-
tional courts would be to imbue them with air of authority); see also Ginsburg, supra
note 3, at 335 (explaining that citations to international sources reflects common re-
spect for individual rights of all people). But seeJackson, supra note 153, at 601 (noting
that U.S. Supreme Court decisions routinely fail to cite to Canadian Supreme Court
cases dealing with similar issues). See generally Law, supra note 140 passim (attempting to
identify neutral theory of constitutional jurisprudence that is easily transportable be-
tween national systems of justice).
199. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (quoting Declaration of Independence as supportive of transnational theory
of jurisprudence); see also Law, supra note 140, at 657 & n.18 (noting Justice Breyer's
invocation of Declaration of Independence as indicia of fundamental concern for views
of all mankind).
200. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15 (statingJustice Breyer's opinion that ration-
ally reasoned opinions of foreign courts facing similar constitutional problems can be
helpful in deciding U.S. constitutional issues). But see Larsen, supra note 111, at 1291
(noting that despite popularity of "reason-borrowing" rationale, no U.S. Supreme Court
opinion has fully relied upon reasoning of non-U.S. courts).
201. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (examining
practices of U.S. states to determine national consensus against juvenile death penalty);
see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (looking to unanimous prohibition
among U.S. states against executing insane offenders in declaring practice to be uncon-
stitutional).
202. See Roper 543 U.S. at 559-60 (Kennedy, J.) (agreeing with Missouri Supreme
Court opinion's rationale in finding constitutional prohibition against juvenile death
penalty); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 & n.30 (StevensJ.) (1988)
(reviewing trend in state laws prohibiting execution ofjuvenile offenders under age 16,
and finding it helpful in process of determining such punishment unconstitutional).
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ignore international sources for similar opinions? 203 The rea-
son-borrowing approach, simply stated, claims that if a line of
reasoning is persuasive or compelling as a theory, no matter
where it originated, it would be irrational not to adopt it if it is
within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution.
20 4
III. REASON WITHOUT BORDERS
Part I of this Note reviewed the historical use of interna-
tional law in U.S. Courts, explained how judge-made interna-
tional law enters U.S. courtrooms, and examined the language
of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases referencing international
law.2 °5 Part II reviewed two differing theories on the use of inter-
national law in U.S. courts - nationalist and transnationalistju-
risprudence. 2 6 This Part begins with a critique of nationalist ju-
risprudence, and continues with an analysis of the U.S. Supreme
Court's current use of international law in constitutional inter-
pretation. This Part concludes with a recommendation for how
U.S. courts might cite international law in future constitutional
cases.
A. Problems With Nationalist Jurisprudence
The nationalist jurisprudence model cites structural differ-
ences between the U.S. legal system and those of different Na-
203. See Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15, at 529, 537 (notingJustice Breyer's opinion
that country of origin is irrelevant in evaluating cogency of argument); see also H. Pat-
rick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261, 266-68 (1987) (describing historical
European view of Roman law as type of "universal learning" that defied national bound-
aries).
204. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884) (noting that there are
many successful non-U.S. judicial systems with similar versions of justice, and stating
that there is nothing "which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every
age" from consideration by U.S. courts); see alsoJackson, supra note 153, at 601 (assert-
ing that formulating answers to constitutional questions implicitly involves comparison
of foreign materials); Scalia & Breyer, supra note 15, at 537 (repeating Justice Breyer's
view that good ideas are good ideas, regardless of country of origin). See generally Law,
supra note 140, at 735 (arguing that although use of foreign legal materials raises legiti-
mate concerns, they are not any more dangerous than other types of materials used to
decide constitutional issues).
205. See supra notes 15-136 and accompanying text (reviewing early U.S. Supreme
Court cases citing international law; explaining how U.S. judges formulate CIL and jus
cogens norms; reviewing recent U.S. Supreme Court cases referencing international
law).
206. See supra notes 137-204 and accompanying text (explaining theories of nation-
alist and transnationalist jurisprudence).
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tions as a reason for the irrelevance of international law,20 7 but
ignores the important and frequent convergence of identical le-
gal reasoning on paramount legal matters common to all human
beings. 2" At the core of many of the criticisms proponents of
nationalist jurisprudence have leveled at international law is that
the U.S. Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, should not
have its power usurped by the influence of non-U.S. Nations.209
In this they are correct, but only in cases where there is a conflict
between a clear and unambiguous constitutional precedent and
an internationally agreed upon concept. 210
The rationale behind nationalist jurisprudence theory
breaks down when examining issues upon which the Constitu-
tion provides minimal guidance or is completely silent.211 For
instance, although it is unclear if the constitutionality of laws
regulating consensual sexual conduct or a woman's right to have
an abortion were issues contemplated by the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution, the text is silent as to their intent.212 In such cases,
because the concerns of nationalistjurisprudence are not clearly
implicated, the debate may shift from a discussion of whether
consultation of how other Nations address these issues is consti-
tutionally prohibited, to whether such consultation is really ben-
eficial in reaching a decision.213
207. See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text (noting criticism that use of
international law is irrelevant in U.S. Constitutional interpretation because U.S. system
is unique and different from other Nations' systems).
208. See supra notes 196-200, 203-04 and accompanying text (arguing that interna-
tional legal principles might be of use in difficult U.S. constitutional decisions).
209. See supra note 164-69, 173 and accompanying text (detailing criticism that use
of international law in U.S. courts is undemocratic; examining pending legislation seek-
ing to restrict use of international law in U.S. judicial opinions).
210. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text (discussing models of exposi-
tory and empirical transnational jurisprudence).
211. See supra notes 156, 180 and accompanying text (recounting arguments that
comparative constitutional analysis may help to inform U.S. courts considering difficult
or undefined constitutional issues).
212. E.g., supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text (explaining U.S. Supreme
Court's empirical use of international law in cases where there is no U.S. precedent).
213. See supra notes 196-200, 203-04 and accompanying text (listing benefits of
comparative constitutional analysis). But see supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text
(arguing that taking account of international norms is wrong because most Nations
endorse more rights-restrictive constitutional theories than United States).
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B. The Weakness of Roper's Articulation: From
Confirmation to Instruction
The assertions by some commentators that Roper represents
a clear victory for proponents of transnationalist jurisprudence
are, at best, premature. 21 4 Although the voices of nationalist ju-
risprudence are increasingly relegated to the text of dissenting
opinions, their persistent criticism continues to temper the tone
of the majority when referencing international sources.2 t5 In-
deed, from some perspectives, Roper's articulation of the impor-
tance of international sources represents a step back from previ-
ous formulations of the Court's transnational jurisprudence. 216
It is easy to see why the bifurcated decisional process Justice
Kennedy invokes in Roper is undesirable.2 17 The process involves
a legal decision based on U.S. law, followed by a "confirmatory"
glance at international sources for approval.21 8 Without a system
that permits consideration of international law, U.S. judges may
seek to hide the international source of their reasoning, and in-
stead attempt to inject the international values they agree with
into their decisions through reinterpretation of U.S. constitu-
tional provisions.2 19 This transparency problem is vividly illus-
trated in Roper's articulation of the power of international
sources. 2 2 ' The majority opinion's statement that international
law is used only as "confirmation" of the Court's decision is im-
mediately belied by the subsequent text of the opinion, which
characterizes international sources as "instructive" in formulat-
214. See supra note 151 (describing increase in academic resistance to usage of
international legal principles in U.S. constitutional adjudication).
215. See supra notes 128-36, 150 and accompanying text (examining language of
U.S. Supreme Court's Roper opinion, which purportedly relied on international law as
"confirmation" of an already-reached conclusion; stating opinion that those U.S. Su-
preme CourtJustices who decry international law as irrelevant are increasingly heard in
dissents rather than majority opinions).
216. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (examining defensive language
employed by Roper's majority opinion to justify use of international sources).
217. See supra note 14 (discussing Professor Peter J. Spiro's theory that forces of
globalism will increasingly influence U.S. policy).
218. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (positing that international law
may be used by U.S. courts deciding close constitutional cases for "confirmatory"
value).
219. See supra note 164-69 and accompanying text (arguing that U.S. judges con-
sulting international law in U.S. cases are subjected to criticism as "judicial activists").
220. See supra note 128-34 and accompanying text (reviewing content of Roper's
majority opinion; highlighting defensive language used to justify use of international
law in finding death penalty for mentally retarded offenders unconstitutional).
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ing an opinion on the constitutionality of the juvenile death pen-
alty. 22 1 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court cases cited by Roper
each seem to indicate that international sources may be con-
sulted for more than mere confirmation, but less than control-
ling precedent.222 The true role of international sources in Roper
seems to occupy a position somewhere on the continuum of in-
fluence between confirmatory and controlling power.223
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of the "confir-
matory" value of international law illustrates the problem with a
"weak transnationalist" theory of international legal influence.224
It is an ill-reasoned theory constructed to escape the inevitable
accusations of 'judicial activism," and calculated to defend
against the criticism of international-law opponents. 225 This
"confirmatory" position gives inadequate force and effect to in-
ternational sources, particularly where the Constitution is silent
and international laws or opinions command a unanimous or
nearly unanimous world position. 226
A confirmatory power for international law is unworkable
because it necessarily implicates a post-analysis consultation, sug-
gesting that international sources have no direct influence on a
U.S. court's actual deliberative process. 227 None of the recent
Supreme Court opinions citing international law attempt to ex-
221. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (analyzing Roper's majority
opinion and discussing criticism in Roper's dissent).
222. See supra notes 118-20, 125-27 and accompanying text (relating U.S. Supreme
Court's citation of international law in Atkins and Lawrence, noting that in each case,
international law was not used as specific basis for holding).
223. See supra notes 128, 136 and accompanying text (discussing continuum of def-
erence afforded to international sources by various U.S. courts; criticizing Lawrence and
Roper for substantively relying on international law to reach U.S. constitutional deci-
sion).
224. See supra notes 132-34, 184-95 and accompanying text (arguing that holding
in Roper was based solely on examination of U.S. law, and that international sources
were consulted only as "confirmation" of that decision; laying out basic theories of weak
transnationalist jurisprudence).
225. See supra notes 5, 6, 18, 112, 120, 125-26, 135-36 and accompanying text (not-
ing variety of criticism attending modern U.S. Supreme Court opinions mentioning
international sources; describing relation between criticism of consulting international
sources and traditional accusations of judicial activism).
226. See supra notes 15-17, 196-204 and accompanying text (explaining that early
U.S. Supreme Court relied more heavily on international law than current Court; ana-
lyzing "strong transnationalist" theory of jurisprudence, which considers international
law to be helpful in deciding complex constitutional cases).
227. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (reviewing language used in
Roper to articulate proper influence of international sources; noting that Roper's major-
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plain just how such a bifurcated decisional process might oper-
ate.228 Indeed, it may be that by definition, a "post-analysis," or
"confirmatory" consultation of international laws and norms is
simply impossible to achieve, since it implicates an attempt to
impose an artificial barrier between the twin judicial processes of
deliberation and decision that is both unworkable and undesir-
able.229
A confirmatory use of international law in U.S. constitu-
tional interpretation reduces legal ideas into two types, "interna-
tional" and "national," then attempts to restrict judges to only
"national" laws in considering how to decide a case. 2' ° This ap-
proach is unlikely to work, as judges are likely to endorse an effi-
cient, logical rule that fits within the framework of the U.S. Con-
stitution, regardless of the country of its origin. 2 1 Because this
artificial compartmentalization is likely to fail, a "confirmatory"
power for international law is undesirable and may be a
powerfully dangerous incentive for judges to be less transparent
in sharing their reasons for deciding a case.23 2
C. A Framework for U.S. Courts Citing International Law
The U.S. Supreme Court has referred extensively to interna-
tional sources in recent cases involving contentious constitu-
tional issues. 233 Although the language of these decisions seeks
to downplay their reliance on international sources, critics have
ity opinion held execution of mentally retarded offenders unconstitutional before dis-
cussing international law supporting decision).
228. See supra notes 107-36 and accompanying text (surveying recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases invoking international law; noting exact power of international law in U.S.
Constitutional interpretation is not clearly defined, and is hotly debated).
229. See supra notes 131-34, 182, 184-95 (recounting Roper's explanation of "con-
firmatory" power of international sources; relating this use of international law to "weak
transnationalist" theory of jurisprudence).
230. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text (noting language in Roper em-
phasizing that international sources were used as confirmatory tools, rather than as
basis for decision, in coming to decision on consitutional issue)
231. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text (discussing "strong transna-
tionalism" theory of jurisprudence, advocating use of international legal norms when
trying to decide complex U.S. Constitutional questions).
232. See supra notes 162-63, 204 and accompanying text (criticizing use of interna-
tional law in U.S. constitutional analyis; pointing out that judges may use international
sources to justify imposing their personal beliefs on U.S. citizens).
233. See supra notes 107-36 and accompanying text (recounting facts and opinions
in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper noting that each case cited to international legal
sources).
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rightly pointed out that in each case, international sources were
in fact used as part of the Court's reasoned basis for coming to a
decision.2 34 This Note suggests that decisions like Roper should
not seek to hide their reliance on international law, but should
instead develop a transparent framework for doing so. 21
5
The outline of this framework might be found in the way
that federal common law works.23 6  Like principles of interna-
tional law, federal common law is not created by the executive or
legislatures, and is susceptible to similar criticism of being un-
democratic. 237 Federal common law is recognized as useful for
applying consistent national rules in important areas of federal
concern, and international law might be used in a similar fash-
ion.2 38 In areas of constitutional interpretation where the law is
silent - such as unenumerated due process rights, or the inter-
pretation of terms like "cruel and unusual punishment" - a
U.S. court might adopt a system for looking to international law
like that enunciated in Lincoln Mills.239 A U.S. court might sur-
vey the laws and practices of the world for rules that comport
with the underlying purpose of the U.S. Constitution, and adopt
the them as rules of U.S. Constitutional interpretation.24 °
234. See supra notes 120, 125-27, 135-36 and accompanying text (listing objections
raised by dissents in Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper, to use of international sources; noting
assertion that Roper majority opinion used international law as reasoned basis for opin-
ion).
235. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing growing academic de-
bate over propriety of U.S. courts using international sources; providing numerous
sources attempting to identify cohesive theory integrating international law into U.S.
jurisprudence).
236. See supra notes 82-106 and accompanying text (providing definition and over-
view of federal common law; comparing federal common law principles and CIL princi-
ples).
237. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (listing similarities between
methods for defining CIL and federal common law; explaining criticism that both are
undemocratic).
238. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (examining U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Lincoln Mills-, noting one rationale behind concept of federal com-
mon law is value of unitary national rules).
239. See supra notes 101-03, 200-04 and accompanying text (describing Lincoln
Mills decision's method for determining rules of federal common law by surveying prac-
tices of U.S. states and choosing rules which best suit federal objectives; laying out the-
ory of "strong transnationalist"jurisprudence that finds international sources helpful in
deciding close constitutional questions).
240. See supra notes 101-03, 204 and accompanying text (providing analogous pro-
cess through which U.S. courts discern federal common laws by analyzing practices of
U.S. states).
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CONCLUSION
Because a "confirmatory" role for international law in U.S.
court decisions is descriptively inaccurate and normatively empty
of content, the search for a cohesive constitutional theory for
comparative constitutional analysis continues.24 ' This Note has
argued that the separation of the deliberative process from the
examination of international sources as confirmation is an artifi-
cial and unhelpful distinction. Likewise, ignoring the growing
voice of constitutional courts around the world is not only un-
manageable, it is intellectually dishonest. The idea that U.S.
judges can or should ignore well-reasoned arguments for effi-
cient solutions to common constitutional issues simply because
they are "foreign" is a fiction that only serves to mask their actual
deliberative process, a prospect which is both undemocratic and
impermissibly vague.
241. See supra notes 2, 13, 70 (listing scholarly articles attempting to identify cohe-
sive constitutional theories for incorporating international sources into U.S. constitu-
tional deliberations).
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